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Religious Healing Exemptions and the
Jurisprudential Gap Between Substantive
Due Process and Free Exercise Rights
Shaakirrah R. Sanders*
Religious healing parents have vexed state courts for almost a
century. Religious healing is the belief that “prayer” or “spiritual
means,” rather than modern medicine, can cure individuals. Adults and
emancipated minors have the right to refuse medical treatment. Some
states go further and grant religious healing parents a statutory
exemption against criminal and civil actions for child endangerment,
neglect, negligence, manslaughter, and even homicide. This Article
identifies these types of exemptions as an issue of religious childrearing.
Religious healing exemptions demonstrate the difficulty delineating
the line between childrearing rights of parents and the state’s duty to
protect children. Professor James Dwyer argues that exemptions
undermine a state’s legitimate interest in the wellbeing of its most
vulnerable citizens—minor children. Those who, like Dwyer, find
exemptions untenable also have difficulty understanding why a state
would allow a parent or guardian to refuse lifesaving medical treatment
for a child in need. Proponents of religious healing argue that exemptions
do nothing more than accommodate free exercise and substantive due
process rights to the care, custody, and control of minor children and
dependents. Those who support this view of exemptions may also have
difficulty understanding how or why a state could have authority to
intrude on the privacy rights of parents or guardians.
This Article uniquely contributes to the religious healing debate by
bringing together substantive due process and the Free Exercise Clause
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jurisprudence. Part I of this Article discusses the nature and scope of
statutory exemptions in U.S. States. Parts II and III of this Article
explore exemptions from the perspective of substantive due process and
the Free Exercise Clause, respectively. Parts II and III also examine
the impact of exemptions on those left in the gap: children, nonconsenting
parents, and the state itself. Regardless of intent, exemptions can trump
both a nonconsenting parent’s right to childrearing and a child’s
independent right to life. Exemptions may also expose inconsistencies in
the exercise of government intrusion on constitutionally recognized
fundamental rights.
Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 634
I. Statutory Exemptions for Religious Healing Parents ............................................ 639
II. Substantive Due Process and Religious Childrearing .......................................... 653
III. Religious Exemptions and the Free Exercise Clause ......................................... 660
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INTRODUCTION
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health1 recognizes the right to refuse
medical treatment, but the question remains whether parents have the right to elect
religious healing rather than modern medicine when a child suffers from a curable
disease, illness, or injury. Religious healing is the belief that “prayer” or “spiritual
means,” rather than modern medicine, can cure. Many U.S. states provide an
exemption when a parent objects to childhood vaccinations and school
immunizations. Some states go further and grant statutory exemptions to religious
healing parents as a defense against criminal convictions. These types of exemptions
apply to misdemeanors like child endangerment or nonsupport. Other exemptions
include felonies like manslaughter and homicide. Exemptions also apply in civil
cases and can prevent recovery of damages when a parent abuses or neglects a child.
Approximately forty-three U.S. states and the District of Columbia have some type
of exemption.
The existence of a religious healing exception is not always outcome
determinative on whether a parent will escape criminal prosecution or civil liability
for the failure to seek medical care. One state court struck down a religious healing
statute because neither the First Amendment nor substantive due process required
the exemption. Other state courts found the exemption did not apply to the charged
crime. At least one state court found the exercise of an exemption did not constitute
any type of criminal offense. Other state courts overturned convictions because the
defendants did not receive proper notice of the exemption’s inapplicability to
criminal conduct.
1.

See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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Religious healing exemptions lie at the intersection of religious freedom and
parental rights to childrearing. Scholars, like state courts, disagree on the necessity
of religious healing exemptions. Some argue exemptions undermine a state’s
legitimate interest in the wellbeing of its most vulnerable citizens—minor children.
Those who find exemptions untenable also find it difficult to understand why the
state would allow a parent or guardian to refuse lifesaving medical treatment for a
child in need. Others argue that exemptions do nothing more than accommodate
religious childrearing by protecting parental rights to the care, custody, and control
of children and dependents. Those who support this view of exemptions may also
find it difficult to understand how or why a state has authority to intrude on the
privacy and religious rights of parents or guardians.
This Article contemplates how religious healing exemptions implicate a child’s
right to life. Professor James Dwyer rejects the view that parents are “entitled to
control the life” of children “in accordance with their own preferences.”2 Applying
an exemption to involuntary manslaughter may be helpful to understanding
Dwyer’s point. Many states define involuntary manslaughter as a type of
“unlawful killing” that results from the perpetration or attempted perpetration
of an “unlawful act.” Where an exemption applies, the state is unable to meet
its burden of proof to show an unlawful act because a death that occurs after
the pursuit of religious healing is “lawful.” In purpose and in effect, these
parents have absolute control to determine whether a child lives or dies—free
from state interference.
Religious healing is a lightning rod in a number of U.S. states. In early 2018 in
Idaho, which has the strongest of all state exemptions, hundreds of demonstrators
marched the state capitol in Boise with baby sized coffins in protest of the state’s
religious healing exceptions.3 Various provisions of the Idaho Code protect parents
who choose to treat a minor dependent’s medical condition through “prayer”
or “spiritual means” alone.4 These protections apply in different contexts. First,
Idaho requires courts to take any spiritual treatment given “by prayer of spiritual
means alone” into consideration when ordering emergency medical treatment for a
child.5 Second, Idaho prevents criminal prosecutions for nonsupport,6 neglect,7

2. James G. Dwyer, Spiritual Treatment Exemptions to Child Medical Neglect Laws: What We
Outsiders Should Think, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 147, 163 (2000).
3. Kyle Pfannenstie, March to Capitol Calls for Removal of Faith-Based Healing Exemptions,
IDAHO COUNTRY FREE PRESS (Feb. 26, 2018), http://www.idahocountyfreepress.com/news/
2018/feb/26/march-capitol-calls-removal-faith-based-healing-ex/ [https://perma.cc/58BP-2Z3J].
4. See generally IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 16-1602(28) (West 1976), 16-1627(3) (West 1976), 18401(2) (West 1972), 18-1501(4) (West 1977), 18-4006(2) (West 1972).
5. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1627(3) (West 1976).
6. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-401(2) (West 1972).
7. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1602(28) (West 1976).
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criminal injury to a child,8 and involuntary manslaughter.9 Finally, Idaho prohibits
civil actions for child endangerment and neglect.10
Religious healing costs lives. In 2013, an Idaho child fatality team reported
“five [preventable] deaths of infants less than a month old” in one religious healing
community.11 Three years later, the team reported two more child deaths “under
circumstances where medical care would have prevented death.”12 That same report
determined that from 2002 to 2011, the number of child deaths in one religious
healing community exceeded ten times the statewide average.13
In Idaho, exemptions expose a dual system of investigating criminal law
violations. Canyon County Sheriff, Kieran Donahue, recently shared how religious
healing parents have often moved a deceased child’s body or changed the deceased
child’s clothing before law enforcement arrives at the scene.14 Donahue argues the
failure to preserve the scene and the body can prevent investigations into causes of
death,15 which implicates application of the exemption itself.
Amending statutory exemptions for religious healing has been a challenge in
some states, nowhere more so than Idaho. In the 2017 legislative session, Dan
Johnson introduced Senate Bill 1182, which he intended to “reach a balance
between protecting children and honoring parents’ free exercise of religion under
the First Amendment.”16 Senate Bill 1182 would have amended Idaho’s exemptions
to allow greater judicial intervention when a child’s life is at risk and would have

8. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1501(4) (West 1977).
9. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4006(2) (West 1972).
10. See IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 16-1602(28)(a) (West 1976), 16-1627(3) (West 1976).
11. Karen Lehr, Canyon County Sheriff Urging Lawmakers to Make Change to Faith Healing
Laws in Idaho, KIVI 6 (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.kivitv.com/news/canyon-county-sheriffurging-lawmakers-to-make-change-to-faith-healing-laws-in-idaho [https://web.archive.org/web/
20171118230212/http://www.kivitv.com/news/canyon-county-sheriff-urging-lawmakers-to-makechange-to-faith-healing-laws-in-idaho]; see also IDAHO CHILD FATALITY REVIEW TEAM, CHILD
DEATHS IN IDAHO 2012 4, 59–60 (2015), http://www.idcartf.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/
Annual%20Report%20Child%20Deaths%2012CFRT_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TTZ3-KYE8]
[hereinafter CHILD DEATHS IN IDAHO 2012] (reporting two child deaths in 2012); IDAHO
CHILD FATALITY REVIEW TEAM, CHILD DEATHS IN IDAHO 2013, 6, 77–78 ( May
2016), http://idcartf.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/annual%20report%20child%20deaths%202013may2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/ND8A-JN59] [hereinafter CHILD DEATHS IN IDAHO 2013] (in 2013
reporting five infant deaths in families whose religious beliefs prevented medical intervention).
12. Lehr, supra note 11.
13. Id.
14. Id.; see also Nigel Duara, An Idaho Sheriff’s Daunting Battle to Investigate When Children of a
Faith-Healing Sect Die, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2017, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-idahochildren-20170418-story.html [https://perma.cc/9QRJ-XJDV]; Carissa Wolf, In Idaho,
Medical-Care Exemptions for Faith Healing Come Under Fire, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2018,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/in-idaho-medical-care-exemptions-for-faith-healing-comeunder-fire/2018/02/19/18ef29f0-11b5-11e8-8ea1-c1d91fcec3fe_story.html?utm_term=.550f8b6f56c2.
15. See Lehr, supra note 11; Duara, supra note 14.
16. Betsy Russell, Johnson on Faith Healing Bill: ‘Not Sure if It Changes a Whole Lot’,
SPOKESMAN-REV., Mar. 20, 2017, http://www.spokesman.com/blogs/boise/2017/mar/20/
johnson-his-faith-healing-bill-not-sure-it-really-changes-whole-lot/ [https://perma.cc/C8KA-9TLW].
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removed the requirement for a “bona fide religious denomination.”17 Senate Bill
1182 also sought to replace Idaho’s civil exemption with language similar to Idaho’s
Religious Freedom Restoration Act.18 The Idaho Senate ultimately rejected the bill,
11–24.19
Religious healing demonstrates the difficulty delineating the line between the
free exercise and childrearing rights of parents, and the state’s duty to protect
children. Like most states, Idaho generally requires parents to ensure the health and
safety of children. On this, section 16-1601 of the Idaho Code provides clarity:
At all times, the health and safety of the child shall be the primary concern.
Each child coming within the purview of this chapter shall receive,
preferably in his own home, the care, guidance, and control that will
promote his welfare and the best interest of the state of Idaho . . . .20
Contemplating section 16-1601 and other similar state statutes, Jennifer
Rosato argues religious healing exemptions contravene child protection and antiabuse laws.21
Idaho is not the only state that has struggled with a religious healing
exemption. After many years of debate, in 1999, Oregon repealed its exemption and
soon thereafter began prosecuting religious healing parents who refused to provide
medical care to children.22 Oregon is not alone in its repeal. Maryland, Tennessee,
and South Carolina have removed some or all of their exemptions. Some states like
Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Hawaii never enacted a statutory exemption.23
The United States Supreme Court has yet to analyze a statutory exemption for
religious healing parents.24 In 1968 the Court affirmed a federal district court’s
denial of an exemption,25 but that one sentence affirmance provides little guidance
to state courts and legislatures. Nor did the Court provide guidance to legal scholars
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. Betsy Russell, Canyon Sheriff: ‘In My County Alone I’ve Had 3 Deaths in the Last 4
Months, One Yesterday’, SPOKESMAN-REV., Mar. 20, 2017, http://www.spokesman.com/blogs/
boise/2017/mar/20/canyon-sheriff-my-county-alone-ive-had-3-deaths-last-4-months-one-yesterday
[https://perma.cc/CQ2A-EUPL].
20. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1601 (West 1976).
21. See Jennifer L. Rosato, Putting Square Pegs in a Round Hole: Procedural Due Process and the Effect
of Faith Healing Exemptions in the Prosecution of Faith Healing Parents, 29 U.S.F. L. Rev. 43, 59 (1994).
22. Isolde Raftery, Changes in Oregon Law Put Faith-Healing Parents on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, May
29, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/30/us/30followers.html [https://web.archive.org/
web/20150610230118/http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/30/us/30followers.html].
23. See Rosato, supra note 21, at 51 n.39.
24. See also James G. Dwyer, The Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare
and Education Laws as Denials of Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 1321,
1365–1476 (1996) (contemplating child’s equal protection claims against parental exemptions for
religious healing as well as practical obstacles to such challenges). But see Jehovah’s Witnesses in
Wash. v. King Cty. Hosp. Unit No. 1, 390 U.S. 598 (1968), reh’g denied 391 U.S. 961 (1968).
25. Jehovah’s Witnesses, 390 U.S. 598; see also Paula A. Monopoli, Allocating the Costs of Parental
Free Exercise: Striking a New Balance Between Sincere Religious Belief and a Child’s Right to Medical
Treatment, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 319, 341–42 (1991); Jennifer Trahan, Constitutional Law: Parental Denial
of a Child’s Medical Treatment for Religious Reasons, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 307, 311–12 (1990).
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and members of the public who struggle with the issue. As a result, a majority of
states continue to bar some civil actions and criminal prosecutions against parents
who pursue religious healing.
Recently, I joined leading family law scholar, Robin Fretwell Wilson, to
examine statutory exemptions for religious healing.26 This co-authored work
considered how parental decisions to discipline one’s child, like decisions to treat
by faith alone, run deep into religious and cultural belief systems. This work also
explored the limits of parental autonomy and showed that risks to children from
corporal punishment are not as great as once feared, unlike the profound risks from
religious healing.
This Article goes further than my previous co-authored work with Fretwell
Wilson by exploring religious healing exemptions from the perspective of both
substantive due process and the Free Exercise Clause. Prince v. Massachusetts27 limits
the parental autonomy recognized under substantive due process to prevent harm
to a child, even if such harm is in furtherance of religious faith, and even if such
harm is unintentional. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon
v. Smith28 denied a right to a religious exemption as a matter of free exercise from
neutral and generally applicable criminal codes. Part of this Article’s purpose is to
provide an understanding of the interplay between Prince and Smith to demonstrate
how religious healing exemptions lie at the intersection of both. Such an
understanding is necessary to any thoughtful consideration of this issue.
This Article hypothesizes that religious healing exemptions expose
jurisprudential gaps between substantive due process and free exercise rights. Part
I of this Article discusses the nature and scope of religious healing exemptions. Part
I also describes the effects of religious healing on children, a subject of reporting by
researchers in the field. Part I then concludes with a discussion of state court
jurisprudence where parents argued entitlement to a religious healing exemption.
Part II of this Article explores religious healing from the perspective of
substantive due process rights to parental care, custody, and control of minor
children and dependents. In general, this jurisprudence demonstrates the “play
within the joint”29 between “the private realm of family life” and the state’s parens
patriae police powers.30 Meyer v. Nebraska31 and Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the
Holy Names of Jesus & Mary32 establish rights to family privacy and autonomy.

26. See Robin Fretwell Wilson & Shaakirrah R. Sanders, By Faith Alone: When Religious Beliefs
and Child Welfare Collide, in THE CONTESTED PLACE OF RELIGION IN FAMILY LAW 308 (Robin
Fretwell Wilson ed., 2018); see also Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Overlooked Costs of Religious Deference,
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1363 (2007).
27. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
28. See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
29. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718–19 (2004).
30. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
31. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
32. See Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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Prince33 limited parental autonomy to dictate religious training that threatened the
health or safety of children. Wisconsin v. Yoder34 affirmed substantive due process
as the source of the right to childrearing, but also preserved the state’s ability to
interfere when there is potential harm to a child. Neither Meyer, Pierce, Prince, nor
Yoder involved parental rights to make medical decisions on behalf of a minor child
or dependent, but this jurisprudence demonstrates how physical and psychological
harm have traditionally provided a baseline for terminating or interrupting parental
rights. Part II highlights another major flaw of most state exemptions: the failure to
explicitly account for the substantive due process rights of nonconsenting parents.
Part II then concludes by pointing out how exemptions threaten the rights of
parents who object to religious healing, including those parents with sole or joint
legal custody of a child.
Part III of this Article explores the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause35
and its jurisprudence surrounding exemptions for religious practice. Part III
discusses Reynolds v. United States,36 Sherbert v. Verner,37 United States v. Seeger,38 and
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,39 which
establish the necessity and scope of religious exemptions. Part III points out that
while none of this jurisprudence concerns an exemption for religious healing
parents, the Court did delineate the boundaries of free exercise rights. Part III also
highlights how exemptions fail to explicitly take into account the independent right
to life of children who suffer from curable diseases and injuries. In this sense,
exemptions expose inconsistencies of government intrusion on constitutionally
recognized fundamental rights.
I. STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS FOR RELIGIOUS HEALING PARENTS
As defined in this Article, “religious healing”40 is the belief that “prayer” or
“spiritual means,” rather than modern medicine can cure individuals. Professor
Barry Nobel traces the origin and history of religious healing in the West and “the
development of religious healing in American culture.”41 Nobel describes the

33. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 158.
34. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
35. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
36. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
37. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
38. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
39. See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
40. See Barry Nobel, Religious Healing in the Courts: The Liberties and Liabilities of Patients,
Parents, and Healers, 16 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 599, 606–12 (1993), for a thorough overview of
religious healing among western faiths and in the United States.
41. Id. at 602.
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connection between religion and healing as undeniable and historical.42 Nobel
recounts how pre-Augustinian Christians revered “spiritual healing.”43
Early U.S. Christians embraced the freedoms that came with a
constitutionalized right to religious practice, as evidenced by reports of religious
curing at “revival meetings” and “the establishment of ‘healing homes’—in which
various forms of treatment were combined with prayer.”44 During the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, “[t]he spread of Enlightenment theories regarding the
material causation of disease” and “intellectual secularism and social pluralism”
undercut belief in prayer as a sole means of healing.45 Up until this time, religious
healing was discouraged, but never completely discontinued, in Western Europe.46
Contemporary Americans seek and entertain a wide diversity of non-medical
practices that connect “healing and mental states.”47 Nobel observes how modern
religious and nonreligious practitioners “make use of material and performative aids
to diagnose, prescribe remedies, and cure illness.”48 These practitioners employ
eastern, spiritualist, psychotherapeutic, and shamanic methods of healing.
Nonmedical healing has not subsided and now includes religious and nonreligious
practices from around the world.49 In 1998, Professor Meredith McGuire “located
one hundred thirty religious healing groups in one suburban New Jersey county
alone.”50
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health recognizes that adults and
emancipated minors have the right to refuse medical treatment;51 however, the
question remains whether parents have the right to exercise that choice on behalf
of their minor children and dependents. Despite widespread acceptance of nonmedical methods of healing in U.S. culture, religious healing exemptions are of
“fairly recent vintage.”52 Professors Janna Merrick and Ann Massie observed that
by 1974, only eleven states had an exemption.53 At that time, “[t]he very premise of

42. See id. at 606.
43. See id. at 607. Nobel describes how Augustine “declared that Christians were no longer to
seek a continuation of the gift of physical healing.” By the Reformation era, Protestant theologians
warned their followers against expecting “miracle cures.”
44. Id.
45. Id. at 607–08.
46. Id. at 607 (“Reformers criticized what they considered Roman Catholic magical practices
and questioned the belief that prayer and other ritual acts would lead to physical healing.”).
47. See id. at 608–11.
48. Id. at 611.
49. See id.
50. Id. (citing MEREDITH MCGUIRE, RITUAL HEALING IN SUBURBAN AMERICA 9 (1988)).
51. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
52. Monopoli, supra note 25, at 331.
53. See generally Ann MacLean Massie, The Religion Clauses and Parental Health Care DecisionMaking for Children: Suggestions for a New Approach, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 725, 734 (1994); Janna
C. Merrick, Spiritual Healing, Sick Kids, and the Law: Inequities in the American Healthcare System, 29
AM. J.L. & MED. 269, 278 (2003).
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an abuse or neglect statute [was] that parental rights do not encompass certain types
of behavior and that parental duties necessarily require others.”54
Religious healing exemptions hold no historic place in the common law that
could have led to early recognition under the U.S. Constitution.55 In 1868, a
common law jury declined to impose criminal liability on religious healing parents
who failed to provide medical care for a sick child in Regina v. Wagstaffe.56 The jury
acquitted the parents in Wagstaffe,57 who belonged to a religious sect known as the
“Peculiar People.”58 Professor Paula A. Monopoli questions whether Wagstaffe
reached the ultimate question of whether the common law required an exemption.59
Instead, according to Monopoli, Wagstaffe did nothing more than “leave to the jury
the question of whether the religious belief of the parent was reasonable.”60
Monopoli points to two post-Wagstaffe developments to support her argument.
First, Parliament amended the Poor Law Amendment in response to Wagstaffe.61
That Amendment required parents to provide medical aid to children.62 Second,
several years after passage of the Amendment, the Crown brought successful
prosecutions against parents whose religious beliefs prevented them from seeking
medical treatment for their sick child in Regina v. Downes.63
Despite the lack of constitutional or statutory protections, religious healing
parents have vexed state supreme courts for over a century.64 In 1903, the New

54. Massie, supra note 53, at 743.
55. But see Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878).
56. See Regina v. Wagstaffe, 10 Cox’s Crim. Cases 531 (1868) (U.K.).
57. Robert L. Trescher & Thomas N. O’Neill, Jr., Medical Care for Dependent Children:
Manslaughter Liability of the Christian Scientist, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 203, 205–06 (1960).
58. Id.
59. Monopoli, supra note 25, at 327.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 329–30.
63. Regina v. Downes [1875] QBD 25 (Eng.).
64. See generally Matter of Appeal of Cochise Cty. Juvenile Action No. 5666-J, 650 P.2d
459 (Ariz. 1982); Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988); In re D.L.E., 645 P.2d 271
(Colo. 1982); People v. Lybarger, 700 P.2d 910 (Colo. 1985); Lybarger v. People, 807 P.2d 570
(Colo. 1991); Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1991); Bradley v. State, 84 So. 677 ( Fla. 1920);
Hermanson v. State, 604 So. 2d 775 ( Fla. 1992); People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769
(Ill. 1952); State v. Chenoweth, 163 Ind. 94 (1904); Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959);
Dalli v. Bd. of Educ., 267 N.E.2d 219 (Mass. 1971); Custody of a Minor, 393 N.E. 836 (Mass. 1979);
Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609 (Mass. 1993); State v. McKown, 475 N.W.2d 63
(Mass. 1991); Brown v. Stone, 378 So. 2d 218 (Miss. 1979); People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68
N.E. 243 (1903); In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fam. Ct. 1970), aff’d, 323 N.Y.S. 253 (1971), aff’d,
278 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1972); Matter of Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 1979); Owens v. State, 6
Okla. Cr. 110, 116 P. 345 (Crim. App. 1911); Beck v. State, 233 P. 495 (Okla. Crim. App. 1925);
Commonwealth v. Nixon, 761 A.2d. 1151 (Pa. 2000); In re Green, 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1972); see also
Jehovah’s Witnesses in Wash. v. King Cty. Hosp. Unit No. 1, 278 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967),
aff’d, 390 U.S. 598 (1968), reh’g denied, 391 U.S. 961 (1968); In re Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48
(Ct. App. 1979); In re Eric, 189 Cal. Rptr. 22 (Ct. App. 1987); People v. Rippberger, 231 Cal. App. 3d
1667 (1991); J.V. v. State, 516 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson,
320 A.2d 518 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974); State v. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d 931 (Ohio
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York Court of Appeals in People v. Pierson65 held that religious belief was not a
defense against criminal charges arising from the failure to provide medical
treatment.66 In 1911 in Owens v. State,67 and again in 1925 in Beck v. State,68 the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals upheld a father’s criminal conviction arising
from attempting to heal a child through prayer.69 In 1959 in Craig v. State,70 the
Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that religious belief was not a defense to criminal
charges for the failure to provide medical treatment to a child.71 However, not all
state courts agreed with New York, Oklahoma, and Maryland. In 1920 in Bradley v.
State,72 the Florida Supreme Court held “manslaughter” excluded death by denial of
medical treatment to a child.73 By the 1960s, a majority of state supreme courts had
disagreed with Bradley and held that religious belief was not a defense against
prosecution for the failure to provide medical treatment to a child.74

Ct. C.P. 1984); In re Willmann, 493 N.E.2d (Ohio Ct. App. 1986); Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 497
A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); State v. Norman, 808 P.2d 1159 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
65. See Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243; see generally Monopoli, supra note 25, at 328.
66. See Pierson, 68 N.E. at 244–47; see also Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009 (explaining that parents
are not required to accept treatment that is not widely embraced by the medical community).
67. Owens, 116 P. 345; see generally Monopoli, supra note 25, at 328.
68. Beck, 233 P. 495; see generally Monopoli, supra note 25, at 328.
69. See Owens, 116 P. at 345–46; Beck, 233 P. at 495–96.
70. Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959); see generally Monopoli, supra note 25, at
328.
71. Craig, 155 A.2d at 689; see also People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769, 771–74
(Ill. 1952) (holding that appointment of guardian for child of religious healing parents who refused a
blood transfusion did not violate the First Amendment).
72. Bradley v. State, 79 Fla. 651, 84 So. 677 (1920); see generally Monopoli, supra note 25, at 328.
73. Bradley, 84 So. at 679.
74. Compare People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243 (1903), State v. Chenoweth, 163
Ind. 94, 71 N.E. 197 (1904), Owens, 116 P. 345, Beck, 233 P. 495, Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. 1952),
and Craig, 155 A.2d 684, with Bradley, 84 So. 677.
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In the last fifty years, religious healing exemptions have frustrated legal
scholars75 and fascinated law students.76 In 1974, the federal Child Abuse
75. See generally Jennifer E. Chen, Family Conflicts: The Role of Religion in Refusing Medical
Treatment for Minors, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 643 (2007); Jennifer M. Collins, Crime and Parenthood: The
Uneasy Case for Prosecuting Negligent Parents, 100 N.W.U. L. REV. 807 (2006); James M. DeLise,
Religions Exemptions to Neutral Laws of General Applicability and the Theory of Disparate Impact
Discrimination, 6 COL. J. RACE & L. 115, 120 (2016); James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s
Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents’ Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371 (1994); Dwyer, supra note 24;
Dwyer, supra note 2, at 163; Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a “Religious Question” Doctrine?: Judicial
Authority to Examine Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 497 (2005); Adam Lamparello,
Taking God out of the Hospital: Requiring Parents to Seek Medical Care for Their Children Regardless of
Religious Belief, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 47 (2001); Sana Loue, Parentally Mandated Religious Healing
for Children: A Therapeutic Justice Approach, 27 J.L. & REL. 397 (2012); Ann MacLean Massie, The
Religion Clauses and Parental Health Care Decision-Making for Children: Suggestions for a New Approach,
21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 725, 746 (1994); Janna C. Merrick, Spiritual Healing, Sick Kids, and the
Law: Inequities in the American Health Care System, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 269, 274 (2003); Paula
A. Monopoli, Allocating the Costs of Parental Free Exercise: Striking a New Balance Between Sincere
Religious Belief and a Child’s Right to Medical Treatment, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 319 (1991); Barry Nobel,
Religious Healing in the Courts: The Liberties and Liabilities of Patients, Parents, and Healers, 16 PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 599 (1993); Jennifer L. Rosato, Putting Square Pegs in a Round Hole: Procedural Due
Process and the Effect of Faith Healing Exemptions in the Prosecution of Faith Healing Parents, 29
U.S.F. L. Rev. 43 (1994); Jennifer Trahan, Constitutional Law: Parental Denial of a Child’s Medical
Treatment for Religious Reasons, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 307, 337 (1990); Trescher & O’Neill Jr., supra
note 57, at 208–12; Wilson, supra note 26.
76. See generally Janet J. Anderson, Note, Capital Punishment of Kids: When Courts Permit Parents
to Act on Their Religious Beliefs at the Expense of Their Children’s Lives, 46 VAND. L. REV. 755 (1993);
Josh Burk, Note, Mature Minors, Medical Choice, and the Constitutional Right to Martyrdom, 102
VA. L. REV. 1355 (2016); Emily Catalano, Comment, Healing or Homicide? When Parents Refuse Medical
Treatment for Their Children on Religious Grounds, 18 Buff. Women’s L.J. 157 (2010); Brittany S. Davis,
Note, Hospitalized by Law: The Abrogation of Parental Rights by Hospitals and Child Welfare Courts, 59
HOW. L.J. 527 (2016); Annamaria Del Buono, Note, Living on a Prayer: Faith Healers Escaping Criminal
Liability for Child Abuse Through Religious Affirmative Defenses & Exemption Laws, 17 RUTGERS
J.L. & REL. 449 (2016); LaDonna DiCamillo, Comment, Caught Between the Clauses and the Branches:
When Parents Deny Their Child Nonemergency Medical Treatment for Religious Reasons, 19 J. JUV. L. 123
(1998); Ivy B. Dodes, Note, “Suffer the Little Children. . .,” Toward a Judicial Recognition of a Duty of
Reasonable Care Owed Children by Religious Faith Healers, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 165 (1987); JoAnna
A. Gekas, Note, California’s Prayer Healing Dilemma, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 395 (1987); Jennifer
L. Hartsell, Comment, Mother May I. . .Live? Parental Refusal of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment for
Children Based on Religious Objections, 66 TENN. L. REV. 499, 502 (1999); Kei Robert Hiraswa, Note,
Are Parents Acting in the Best Interests of Their Children when They Make Medical Decisions Based on
Their Religious Beliefs?, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 316 (2006); Daniel J. Kearney, Comment, Parental Failure to
Provide Child with Medical Assistance Based on Religious Beliefs Causing Child’s Death—Involuntary
Manslaughter in Pennsylvania, 90 DICK. L. REV. 861 (1986); Catherine W. Laughran, Religious Beliefs
and the Criminal Justice System: Some Problems of the Faith Healer, 8 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 396, 408 (1975);
Donna K. LeClair, Comment, Faith Healing and Religious-Treatment Exemptions to Child-Endangerment
Laws: Should Parental Religious Practices Excuse the Failure to Provide Necessary Medical Care to
Children?, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 79 (1987); Anne D. Lederman, Note, Understanding Faith:
When Religious Parents Decline Conventional Medical Treatment for Their Children, 45 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 891 (1995); Elizabeth A. Lingle, Commentary, Treating Children by Faith: Colliding
Constitutional Issues, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 301 (1996); Laura M. Plastine, Comment, “In God We Trust”:
When Parents Refuse Medical Treatment for Their Children Based upon Their Sincere Religious Beliefs, 3
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 123, 124 n.3 (1993); Shelli D. Robinson, Comment, Commonwealth
v. Twitchell: Who Owns the Child?, 7 J. CONTEMP. L. & POL’Y 413 (1991); Judith L. Scheiderer, Note,
When Children Die as a Result of Religious Practices, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1429 (1990); Elizabeth J. Sher,

First to Printer_Sanders (Do Not Delete)

644

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

9/10/2018 10:25 AM

[ Vol. 8:633

Prevention and Treatment Act motivated state legislatures to codify exemptions77
when the Department of Health and Human Services (formerly the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare) interpreted the Act to “require states to amend
their child abuse and neglect statutes to include an exemption.”78 The Department
also deemed states who failed to amend their statutes ineligible for federal child
abuse prevention funding.79 According to Monopoli, this interpretation caused
almost every state to amend their statute.80 Rosato reports that thirty-three states
passed exemptions after 1974.81 The 1983 amendments to the federal act removed
the requirement for an exemption,82 but the legacy of exemptions remains.83
The Court sidestepped the question of religious healing exemptions in 1968
in Jehovah’s Witnesses in State of Washington v. King County Hospital Unit No. 1.84
There, members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses faith argued that forced blood
transfusions for child members violated the federal Civil Rights Act as well as the
First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.85 The
lawsuit challenged two sections of the Revised Code of Washington. The first was
section 13.04.010(12), which declared children a dependent of the state when their
health was “grossly and willfully neglected” such that medical care becomes a
necessity.86 The second was section 13.03.095, which required the court to make an
Note, Choosing for Children: Adjudicating Medical Care Disputes Between Parents and the States, 58
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 157 (1983); Edward E. Smith, Note, The Criminalization of Belief: When Free
Exercise Isn’t, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1491 (1991); Scott St. Amand, Comment, Protecting Neglect:
The Constitutionality of Spiritual Healing Exemptions to Child Protection Statutes, 12 RICH. J.L. &
PUB. INT. 139 (2009); Deborah S. Steckler, Note, A Trend Toward Declining Rigor in Applying Free
Exercise Principles: The Example of State Courts’ Consideration of Christian Science Treatment for
Children, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 487 (1991); Eric W. Treene, Note, Prayer-Treatment Exemptions to
Child Abuse and Neglect Statutes, Manslaughter Prosecutions and Due Process of Law, 30 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 135 (1993); Rebecca Williams, Note, Faith Healing Exemptions Versus Parens Patriae:
Somethings’ Gotta Give, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 692 (2012).
77. Rita Swan, On Statutes Depriving a Class of Children Rights to Medical Care: Can This
Discrimination Be Litigated?, 2 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 73, 78 (1998). Swan also suggests that
Congress was motivated by heavy lobbying by religious organizations—particularly the Christian
Science Church. See also Monopoli, supra note 25, at 331–32. But see Merrick, supra note 53, at 278
(questioning the role of Christian Science Church in passage of requirement for a religious exemption
to the Federal Child Abuse and Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974).
78. Monopoli, supra note 25, at 331; see also Merrick, supra note 53, at 277; Rosato, supra note 21,
at 59; Massie, supra note 53, at 734.
79. Monopoli, supra note 25, at 331.
80. Id.; see also Merrick, supra note 53, at 278; Rosato, supra note 21, at 58–59.
81. Rosato, supra note 21, at 59.
82. Massie, supra note 53, at 735.
83. See Merrick, supra note 53, at 278–80; Monopoli, supra note 25, at 332–34; Rosato, supra note
21, at 60–61.
84. Jehovah’s Witnesses in Wash. v. King Cty. Hosp. Unit No. 1, 390 U.S. 598, 598 (1968), reh’g
denied 391 U.S. 961 (1968); see also Monopoli, supra note 25, at 342; Trahan, supra note 25, at 311–12.
85. See Jehovah’s Witnesses in Wash. v. King Cty. Hosp. Unit No. 1, 278 F. Supp. 488, 499–
501 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff’d, 390 U.S. 598 (1968), reh’g denied, 391 U.S. 961 (1968); see also Monopoli,
supra note 25, at 341–42; Trahan, supra note 25, at 312.
86. Jehovah’s Witnesses, 278 F. Supp. at 506; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 13.04.010(12) (repealed
1977).

First to Printer_Sanders (Do Not Delete)

2018]

RELIGIOUS HEALING EXEMPTIONS

9/10/2018 10:25 AM

645

order for care, custody, or commitment when the order served the child’s welfare
and the interest of the state.87
The Court’s brief affirmance in Jehovah’s Witnesses provides little to guide a
constitutional analysis of religious healing statutes. The district court held neither
section invalid, even though Washington’s purpose was to compel blood
transfusions.88 The district court relied on Prince v. Massachusetts,89 where in 1944
Justice Rutledge presciently reasoned:
Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow
they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children
before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can
make that choice for themselves.90
Rutledge portents that harm to a child falls outside the scope of parental rights
to religious freedom.91 The district court in Jehovah’s Witnesses reasoned, “neither
the rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation.”92 The district
court also cited People v. Pierson,93 where the New York Court of Appeals held in
1903 that free exercise rights do not encompass exposing a child to communicable
diseases, ill health, or death.94
Forty-three states and the District of Columbia have had at least one type of
religious healing exemption.95 Professor Jennifer Trahan points out that some states
87. Jehovah’s Witnesses, 278 F. Supp. at 501–02; see also WASH. REV. CODE § 13.03.095 (repealed
1977).
88. See Jehovah’s Witnesses, 278 F. Supp. at 504–05; see also Monopoli, supra note 25, at 342;
Trahan, supra note 25, at 312.
89. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
90. Id. at 170.
91. See id.
92. Jehovah’s Witnesses, 278 F. Supp. at 504 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 166); see also Monopoli,
supra note 25, at 342; Trahan, supra note 25, at 312.
93. People v. Pierson, 68 N.E. 243 (N.Y. 1903).
94. Id. at 246.
95. See ALA. CODE § 26-14-1(2) (1986); ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.120(b) (1987);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-531.01 (1989); CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988); ARK. CODE ANN. §
12-12-502(3) (repealed 2009); see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 300, 300.5 (West 1984
& Supp. 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-103(1) (Supp. 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
17-38d (West 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1104 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.503(9)(f) (repealed
1998); IDAHO CODE § 18-401(2) (1987); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4 (2018); IND. CODE ANN. §
35-46-1-4(a), -5(c) (West 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 726.6(l) (West 1979 & Supp. 1990);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(1) (West 1990); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(B)(5) (West Supp. 1990);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4010 (Supp. 1988); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-701(n)(2)
(Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273, § 1(4) (West 1990); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.634
(West Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.378(1)(a)(1) (West 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21105(l)(i), (m) (1972 & Supp. 1988); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.115(3) (West 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. §
41-3-102(4) (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.5085 (1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:3, (XIX)(c)
(Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-1 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-3(L)(5), -3(M)(4)
(1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.15 (McKinney 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-517(21) (1989);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-05.1(2) (1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 852 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.500(l) (1989); 40 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-15 (1984); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-7-490(C)(3) (1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-10-1.1 (1984 & Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 37-1-157(c) (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-19.5 (West 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §
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“empower courts to authorize medical treatment” despite the exemption.96
According to Trahan only about a quarter of states with a parental exemption
actually do so.97
Rosato provides a thorough overview of the type and the scope of religious
healing exemptions.98 Exemptions appear in both criminal and civil codes. Criminal
exemptions include prosecutions for murder and homicides,99 child abuse,100 child
endangerment,101 child neglect,102 contributing to neglect103 or deprivation,104
criminal injury,105 cruelty,106 delinquency,107 failure to provide medical and surgical
attention,108 failure to report suspected child neglect or abuse,109 manslaughter,110
682(3)(C) (Supp. 1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228(2) (1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020(3)
(Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE § 49-1-3(g)(2)(A) (1986); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981(3)(c)(4) (West
1987); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-202(a)(vii) (1978); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-4 (repealed 1992);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3608(l)(c) (repealed 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22(A) (West 1987)
(invalidated in State v. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d 931 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1984) & OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2151.03, .421(A)(1) (West 1990)); 11 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2203 (repealed 1990).
96. Trahan, supra note 25, at 337.
97. Id.
98. See generally Rosato, supra note 21, at 43.
99. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101(a)(9)(B) (1975); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.050(1) (1975);
W. VA. CODE § 61-8D-2(d) (1988).
100. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(30)(f) (1951); FLA. STAT. § 984.03(37) (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C.9:6-8.21 (West 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109(4) (West 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5110(d)(3)(a) (West 1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.1(C) (West 1975); W. VA. CODE § 61-8D-4a(b)
(1997); WIS. STAT. § 948.03(6) (1987).
101. See ALA. CODE § 13A-13-6(b) (1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1104 (1972) (applying
only to misdemeanors that do not cause serious physical injury); IOWA CODE § 726.6 (West 1976);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 557 (1975); MINN. STAT. § 609.378 (1983); MO. REV. STAT. §
568.050(4)(2) (1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:3 (1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24-4 (West
1978); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.15 (McKinney 1965); OHIO REV. CODE § 2919.22(A) (West 1973);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 852.1 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3608(1)(c) (repealed
2010) (applying to misdemeanors only).
102. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.2(b) (West 1987); IND. CODE § 35-46-1-14 (1981);
LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:93(B) (1942); MINN. STAT. § 609.378 (1983); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-105(l)(i)
(1972 & Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C.9:6-8.21 (West 1974); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-1-105
(1968); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 843.5(C) (1963); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-9-5(b) (West 1909);
40 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-11-15 (West 1976) (does not apply if a child is harmed); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-109(4) (West 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-110(3)(a) (1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2371.1(C) (1975); W. VA. CODE § 61-8D-4(d) (1988).
103. See MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-105(l)(i), 97-5-39 (1972 & Supp. 1988).
104. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 15-11-2, 16-12-1(b)(3) (2013).
105. See IDAHO CODE §§ 18-401(2), 18-1501(4) (1987); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(l)(1)
(West 1973).
106. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:93(B) (1942); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-9-5(b); 40
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-11-15 (does not apply if a child is harmed).
107. See MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-105(l)(i), 97-5-39 (West 1972 & Supp. 1988).
108. See MO. REV. STAT. § 568.040(2)(4) (1979); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-314 (1975);
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.42.005 (1997).
109. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988); MINN. STAT. §§ 609.378(1), 626.556(6)(c).
110. See IDAHO CODE §§ 18-401(2), 18-1501(4), 18-4006(2); LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:31, 14:93(B);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-5-29 (1979). States that require prosecutors to prove misdemeanors in order to
prove manslaughter also essentially provide an exemption to manslaughter. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 975-29; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.04 (West 1973); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-314, 18.2-371.1(C)
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nonsupport,111 and omission to provide for a child.112 One state, Louisiana, shields
communications with religious healing practitioners in a criminal case.113 Civil
exemptions apply to claims for child abuse,114 child neglect,115 contributing to
neglect,116 dependency proceedings,117 failure to provide medical care or adequate

(1975). Those states that require proof of a separate felony in order to prove manslaughter provide an
exemption as well. See LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:31, 14:93(B), 14:403(b)(5) (West Supp. 1990). In Iowa,
manslaughter requires proof of a public offense, which essentially acts as an exemption. IOWA CODE
§§ 707.5, 726(d) (1978).
111. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.51.120 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 270; COLO. REV. STAT. 19-3103; IDAHO CODE §§ 18-401(2), 18-1501(4) (1987); IND. CODE § 35-46-1-5 (1976); MO. REV. STAT. §
568.050(4)(2) (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-17.1 (1982).
112. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 852 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
113. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(b)(5) (West Supp. 1990).
114. See ALA. CODE. § 26-14-7.2 (1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201.01 (1970); ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 9-30-103(5)(B) (1987), 12-18-618 (2009); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 18950.5 (West
1978); FLA. STAT. § 39.01(a)(f) (1951); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-2(8) (2013); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/
4 (2018); IOWA CODE § 232.68(d) (1979); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1003(10) (West
1995); MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.115(4) (West 1983); MON. CODE ANN. § 41-3-102(4)(b) (1974);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.21(1)(c) (West 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-05.1(2) (1989);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-1-105(47) (1968); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6303(b)(3)
(West 1990); 40 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-11-15 (West 1976); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228(2) (1988);
WIS. STAT. § 48.981(3)(c)(4) (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4010 (repealed 1976).
115. See ALA. CODE § 26-14-7.2; ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020(d) (1971); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
8-201.01; ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-30-103(5)(B), 12-18-618; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 16509.1
(West 1982), 18950.5 (West 1978); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-401 (1975) (exempting children in life
threatening situations); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 17a-104 (1958), 46b-120(8) (1949); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 16, § 913 (1971); D.C. CODE § 16-2301(9)(B) (1963); FLA. STAT. § 39.01(a)(f) (1951);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-5(b) (1965), 49-5-40(a) (1975), 49-5-180(5) (2015); IDAHO CODE § 161602(28)(a) (1976); 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 5/3 (1975), 5/4; LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 603(18)
(1988), 1003(10); MINN. STAT. § 626.556(2)(g)(5) (1975); MISS. CODE § 43-21-105(l)(i) (West 1972 &
Supp. 1988); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 210.115(4), 211.031, 211.181(4); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-102(4)(b);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:3(XIX)(c); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.21(1)(c); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A4-2(E)(5) (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25.1-05.1(2); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, §§ 1-1-105(20),
1-1-105(47); 40 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-11-15; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 4912(3)(B) (1981);
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228(2); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020(18) (Supp. 1990); WIS. STAT. §
48.981(3)(c)(4); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-202(a)(vii) (1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4010
(repealed 1976).
116. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201.13(b).
117. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201.01; COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-401 (exempting children
in life threatening situations); MISS. CODE §§ 43-21-105(l)(i), 97-5-39; VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-100
(2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020(18).
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treatment,118 failure to report,119 maltreatment,120 negligence,121 nonsupport,122 and
temporary or permanent termination proceedings.123
Rosato distinguishes the text of religious healing exemptions.124 Most
reference “prayer,” “spiritual means,”125 and “bona fide religious
denominations.”126 Some prohibit prosecutions “for the sole reason” or “solely
because” a child received religious healing.127 Others consider religious healing “an
adequate substitute for medical care,”128 “health care,”129 or “other remedial
care.”130 Many states refer to a parent’s legitimate religious practice.131 Christian
Scientists are the sole beneficiary of some exemptions.132
Idaho has the strongest of religious healing exemptions. The Idaho Code
prohibits prosecution against parents who choose to treat a minor child or
118. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.085 (1972); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 300(b)(1), 300(c),
300.5 (West 1984 & Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-11b(f) (1958); IND. CODE § 31-34-1-14
(1997) (exempting situations where life or health is in serious danger); IOWA CODE §§ 232.68(d),
256B.8; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.310(2) (West 1988); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 432B.020(2), 128.013(2),
200.5085 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-1.1 (excluding situations involving communicable diseases and
sanitary matters); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6303(b)(3); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 63-720(4)c, 63-7-950 (1976); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.020(18).
119. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 913; see also LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 603(17)
(imposing special rules on priests, rabbis, deacons, ministers, and religious healing practitioners);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-2-101(E) (1965); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-100; WASH. REV. CODE §
26.44.020(18).
120. See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 17a-104, 46B-120(8); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 603(18).
121. See FLA. STAT. § 984.03(37) (1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(1)(a)8; MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 722.634(14) (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.106(1)(3) (1981); 40 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 4011-15 (West 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-508(3) (West 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1502(cc)(3)
(repealed 2006).
122. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-6-101 (1981).
123. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-531.01 (1989); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16509 (West
1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1103(c) (1951); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-508(3).
124. See Rosato, supra note 21, at 55–57.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. Id. Reference to a specific religious denomination or faith may run counter to Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, which disfavors laws that discriminate among religions.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). The court in Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. asked whether the City of Hialeah’s prohibition against the slaughter of
animals violated the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 523–24. The Court struck down the prohibitions
because they were motivated by religious discrimination against members of the Church of the Lukimi
Babalu Aye. Id. at 525–47. Specifically, the record was replete with evidence that members of the
Hialeah city council expressed discriminatory animus against members of the church. Id. at 526–28,
533–42. Finally, the Court found that the purpose of the prohibition, preventing cruelty to animals, was
insufficiently justified. Id. at 546–47. The prohibition authorized the slaughter of animals for all
other religious and nonreligious purposes except for those related to members of the church. Id. at
542–45. For example, the prohibitions contained exceptions for kosher slaughtering and slaughtering
for nonreligious purposes such as hunting and fumigation. Id. at 543–45.
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dependent’s medical condition through “prayer” or “spiritual means” alone.133
Idaho’s exemption applies when considering whether to order emergency medical
treatment for a child.134 Idaho’s exemption also applies against criminal
nonsupport,135 neglect,136 criminal injury to a child,137 and involuntary
manslaughter.138 Idaho’s exemption also prohibits civil actions for child
endangerment and neglect.139
Religious healing in Idaho has its costs. Idaho began estimating the child
mortality rate among the state’s religious healing community in 2013.140 Researchers
formed their estimate in part by examining graves at a cemetery used exclusively by
religious healers where over 25% of the graves belong to children.141 Idaho Vital
Statistics reported a 3.37% child death rate from 2002 to 2011.142 The child mortality
rate at this cemetery for the same period was around 31%—almost ten-times the
statewide rate.143
Former Idaho Supreme Court Chief Justice Jim Jones, who recently described
himself as “unshackled,”144 implored the state legislature to repeal Idaho’s “faithhealing” exemption.145 According to Jones, if an adult decides “to forego medical
intervention for themselves for religious reasons that is their prerogative.”146 When
it comes to minors, however, Jones argued that Idaho “has an interest in
safeguarding the health and safety of minors who cannot speak for themselves.”147
Moreover, Idaho has “numerous protections for children without religious
exemptions—marital age, child labor, ability to contract, and the like.”148 Jones
concluded that a child’s “right to have basic life-saving healthcare” should trump
any right to parental control or religious exercise.149

133. See generally IDAHO CODE §§ 16-1602(28), 16-1627(3), 18-401(2), 18-1501(4), 18-4006(2)
(1976).
134. See IDAHO CODE § 16-1627(3) (1976).
135. See IDAHO CODE § 18-401(2) (1976).
136. See IDAHO CODE § 16-1602(28) (1976).
137. See IDAHO CODE § 18-1501(4) (1976).
138. See IDAHO CODE § 18-4006(2) (1976).
139. See IDAHO CODE § 16-1602(28)(a), 16-1627(3) (1976).
140. Lehr, supra note 11; see also CHILD DEATHS IN IDAHO 2012, supra note 11, at 4, 59–60;
CHILD DEATHS IN IDAHO 2013, supra note 11, at 6, 77–78.
141. See Lehr, supra note 11.
142. See id.; see also CHILD DEATHS IN IDAHO 2012, supra note 11, at 4, 59–60; CHILD DEATHS
IN IDAHO 2013, supra note 11, at 6, 77–78.
143. See id.
144. Robert Ehlert, ‘Unshackled’ Former Idaho Supreme Court Justice Jim Jones Undaunted by
His Cancer Diagnosis, IDAHO STATESMAN, Feb. 24, 2017, http://www.idahostatesman.com/opinion/
opn-columns-blogs/robert-ehlert/article134782399.html [https://perma.cc/9K7S-2F3H].
145. Jim Jones, Does the Right to Life End at Birth for Some Kids?, SPOKESMAN-REV.,
Feb. 21, 2017, http://media.spokesman.com/documents/2017/02/Jones-faith-healing-oped.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7XMX-9SNH].
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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Jones is not the only Idahoan to raise concerns about statutory exemptions for
religious healing parents. One of the primary beneficiaries of Idaho’s exemption are
members of a church in Canyon County, Idaho.150 Sheriff Kieran Donahue urged
lawmakers to repeal Idaho’s religious exemptions151 due to three religious healingrelated deaths in a four month period in Canyon County during the winter of
2016.152 Jones and Donahue are among the most prominent Idahoans to critique
Idaho’s religious healing statutes.153 But others, like recently defeated Canyon
County Coroner Vicki DeGues-Morris, urged caution and warn that a repeal may
not result in a “change of lifestyle” for religious healers.154 Instead, DeGues-Morris
argued that religious healing communities could “go underground” or report fewer
child deaths.155
The effects of religious healing are not only observable in Idaho. In 1956,
autopsy surgeon Gale Wilson reported on morality rates for one sect of religious
healers—Christian Scientists—in King County, Washington.156 Wilson found that
in a twenty-one-year period, mortality rates were substantially higher than for some
non-Christian Scientists.157 In 1991, William F. Simpson found that graduates of a
Christian Science college had a higher mortality rate than graduates at the University
of Kansas from 1934 to 1983.158
In 1998, Seth Asser and Rita Swan revealed a study of 172 cases of child
fatalities among religious healing sects from 1975 through 1995.159 Asser and Swan
found that survival rates for 140 children “would have exceeded ninety percent, and
150. See Dan Tilkin, Oregon Woman Fights Idaho Faith Healing Laws, KOIN 6 ( Jan. 21, 2016),
http://koin.com/2016/01/21/oregon-woman-fights-idaho-faith-healing-laws/ [https://perma.cc/
B24X-FBHZ].
151. See Lehr, supra note 11.
152. See id.
153. See Betsy Russell, Former Church Member: ‘The Way These Kids Die Is Inhumane,
SPOKESMAN-REV., Aug. 4, 2016, http://www.spokesman.com/blogs/boise/2016/aug/04/formerchurch-member-way-these-kids-die-inhumane [https://perma.cc/ZNV4-7DGC]; see also Linda Martin,
Linda Martin Idaho Faith Healing Testimony, YOUTUBE (Sept. 8, 2016) https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=P9N9Gyrzb80.
154. See Russell, supra note 153; see also Nick Foy & Kyle Pfannenstiel, Coroner’s Primary
Reignites Faith Healing Debate, IDAHO PRESS-TRIB., May 28, 2018, https://www.idahopress.com/
news/local/2cscoop/coroner-s-primary-reignites-faith-healing-debate/article_50acec6d-21ba-57fd935d-60c3b9c1a2a1.html [https://perma.cc/VY49-P2MF].
155. See Russell, supra note 153.
156. See Gale E. Wilson, Christian Science and Longevity, 1 J. FORENSIC SCI. 43, 54–55 (1956);
see also Merrick, supra note 53, at 273.
157. See Wilson, supra note 156, at 54–55.
158. See William F. Simpson, Comparative Mortality of Two College Groups, 1945-1983, 40
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 579 (1991); see also Merrick, supra note 53, at 273.
159. Seth M. Asser & Rita Swan, Child Fatalities from Religion-Motivated Medical Neglect, 191
PEDIATRICS 625, 626–27 (1998); see also Rita Swan, 90 Deaths of Kids Found in Followers of Christ, 2
CHILD NEWSLETTER (Children’s Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc., Sioux City, Iowa), 1998, at 1; Rita
Swan, United Methodist Church Opposes Religious Exemption in Federal Child Abuse Law, 1 CHILD
NEWSLETTER (Children’s Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc., Sioux City, Iowa), 2000, at 1; Rita Swan,
Long History of Apathy in St. Louis Area, 1 CHILD NEWSLETTER (Children’s Healthcare Is a Legal
Duty, Inc., Sioux City, Iowa), 1993, at 4–6; Swan, supra note 77, at 78.

First to Printer_Sanders (Do Not Delete)

2018]

RELIGIOUS HEALING EXEMPTIONS

9/10/2018 10:25 AM

651

an additional eighteen cases would have had survival rates in excess of fifty
percent.”160 Of the fifty-nine children who were newborn, “all but one would have
had a good to excellent expected outcome with medical care.”161
Others have supplemented Asser and Swan’s evidence of the harm suffered
by children of religious healing parents. Fretwell Wilson discusses how Asser and
Swan’s study did not include twelve child deaths in Idaho between 1980 and 1998.162
Merrick discusses how prior to Asser and Swan’s study, an Oregon newspaper
reported the deaths of seventy-eight children in the state between 1955 and 1998.163
Massie reports that between 1984 and 1994, “at least forty children . . . died as a
result of diseases treatable by conventional medical care.”164 Other reports detail
that from 1975 to 1999, at least 165 children died because their parents religiously
objected to treatment by means of traditional or conventional medicine.165
Merrick reported only fifty-five religious healing prosecutions between 1982
and 2003.166 In the past, state courts have proven inconsistent when ruling on the
constitutionality of a religious healing exemption. The Arizona Supreme Court in
1982 in Matter of Appeal in Cochise County Juvenile Action No. 5666-J167 held the
exercise of the exemption did not constitute abuse or neglect.168 The Ohio Court
of Appeals struck down exemptions in 1986 in In re Willmann.169 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court ruled in 2013 that exemptions did not apply to life-threatening
illnesses in State v. Neumann.170 The Indiana Supreme Court in 1986 in Hall v.
State171 and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2000 in Commonwealth v. Nixon172
held the exemption did not apply to the charged crime, which in both cases involved
serious felonies. The California Supreme Court upheld a manslaughter conviction
in 1988 in Walker v. Superior Court,173 but the federal district court later granted
habeas relief on due process grounds.174 Other state courts overturned convictions

160. Asser & Swan, supra note 159, at 626–27.
161. Id.
162. Wilson, supra note 26, at 1383.
163. Merrick, supra note 53, at 274.
164. Massie, supra note 53, at 746.
165. Hartsell, supra note 76, at 502.
166. Merrick, supra note 53, at 281.
167. Matter of Appeal in Cochise Cty. Juvenile Action No. 5666-J, 650 P.2d 459 (Ariz. 1982).
168. See id.
169. See In re Willmann, 24 Ohio App. 3d 191, 199 (1986) (holding that religious faith does not
permit parents to expose child to ill health or death); see also State v. Miskimens, 490 N.E.2d 931, 939
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1984).
170. State v. Neumann, 832 N.W.2d 560 (Wis. 2013).
171. Hall v. State, 493 N.E.2d 433, 435–36 (Ind. 1986).
172. Commonwealth v. Nixon, 761 A.2d 1151, 1152, 1155–57 (Penn. 2000) (rejecting
arguments that the minor was mature and chose on her own to refuse medical care).
173. Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 118–20, 141 (1988).
174. See Walker v. Keldgord, No. CIV S-93-0616 LKK JFM P (E.D. Cal. 1996) (holding
defendant entitled to a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that defendant was inadequately notified
of his criminal conduct). But see In re Eric B., 189 Cal. App. 3d 996, 1006–09 (1987) (holding that
periodic medical review of a child violated neither the First Amendment nor substantive due process);
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because the exemption misinformed criminal defendants of their defenses.175 These
courts include the Minnesota Supreme Court in 1991 in Minnesota v. McKown176 and
the Florida Supreme Court in 1992 in Hermanson v. State.177 The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Twitchell held the exemption applied to
manslaughter in 1993, but the court also reversed the convictions because the
parents in that case relied on a state attorney general’s opinion to the contrary.178
Religious healing parents have recently come under increased scrutiny. In June
2017, Sarah and Travis Mitchell became the fifth couple from the Followers of
Christ Church in Oregon to face charges after relying on prayer alone to heal a
child.179 Five months earlier, Pennsylvania prosecutors charged Jonathan and Grace
Foster, a religious healing couple who refused to provide medical care to a child
( Jonathan’s father, a pastor in the Faith Tabernacle Congregation, was charged
several months later in relation to the child’s death).180 A Michigan judge jailed
Rebecca Bredow in October 2017 for refusing a court order to vaccinate her child—
the mother’s ex-husband who shares joint custody was in favor of vaccination.181
Proponents of religious healing exemptions often point to substantive due
process rights to care, custody, and control of minor children and dependents.
These proponents also question state authority to intrude on the privacy rights of
parents or guardians, which includes the right to rear a child according to one’s
religious beliefs. Dwyer, opposes leading scholars on religious healing exemptions,
In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 800–03 (1979) (holding that a court order to treat an ill child did
not violate the parents’ rights under the First Amendment or substantive due process).
175. See generally Lybarger v. People, 807 P.2d 570 (Colo. 1991) (finding elements of criminal
offense unmet); People v. Lybarger, 700 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1985). For a thorough analysis of the fair
notice argument, see Rosato, supra note 21.
176. State v. McKown, 475 N.W.2d 63, 67–68 (Minn. 1991).
177. Hermanson v. State, 604 So. 2d 775, 782 (Fla. 1992); see also J.V. v. State, 516 So. 2d 1133,
1133–35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that authorization of treatment was proper and that refusal
to grant permission for medical treatment did not constitute abandonment, abuse, or neglect).
178. See Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609, 618–20 (Mass. 1993); see also Custody of
a Minor, 393 N.E.2d 836, 843–46 (Mass. 1979) (holding that rejection of parental preference for
“metabolic treatment” to treat an ill child violated neither the First Amendment nor substantive due
process).
179. See Court Docs Reveal Details About Death of Followers of Christ Infant, KGW 8
( June 8, 2017), http://www.kgw.com/news/local/clackamas-county/infant-death-investigation-inclackamas-county/421286810 [https://perma.cc/YAG4-98TW]; Dan Tilkin, Parents with FaithHealing Ties Charged with Murder, KOIN 6 ( June 5, 2017), http://koin.com/2017/06/05/parentswith-faith-healing-ties-charged-with-murder [https://perma.cc/2XM3-LGQU].
180. See Prosecutor: Pair Charged in Girl’s Death Cited Faith Healing, FOX 29 (Feb. 1, 2017),
http://www.fox29.com/news/local-news/mom-dad-charged-after-daughters-untreated-pneumonialeads-to-death [https://perma.cc/RQD5-B7WS]; Mark Scolforo, Pastor to Face Trial in
Granddaughter’s Faith Healing Death, WITF ( June 28, 2017), http://www.witf.org/news/2017/06/
pastor-to-face-trial-in-granddaughters-faith-healing-death.php [https://perma.cc/KM2B-4NZE].
181. See Kristine Phillips, A Mother Refused to Follow a Court Order to Vaccinate Her Son. Now
She’s Going to Jail., WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-yourhealth/wp/2017/10/04/a-mother-refused-to-follow-a-court-order-to-vaccinate-her-son-now-shesgoing-to-jail/?utm_term=.5d10a688f544; Maggie Fox, Detroit Mom Jailed for Refusing Court Order to
Vaccinate Child, TODAY (Oct. 5 2017), https://www.today.com/health/detroit-mom-jailed-refusingcourt-order-vaccinate-child-t117126 [https://perma.cc/Z9C2-Q59P].
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and counters that parents are not traditional “right-holders” when it comes to
children.182 Instead, parents are “fiduciaries occupying a caretaking role as a matter
of legal privilege.”183 Other opponents argue that exemptions undermine a state’s
legitimate interest in the wellbeing of its most vulnerable citizens—minor children.
Those who find exemptions untenable also have difficulty understanding why a
state would allow a parent or guardian to refuse lifesaving medical treatment for a
child in need. Next, this Article explores substantive due process rights to religious
childrearing, which reveals one-half of the jurisprudential gap that allows for the
existence of exemptions.
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS AND RELIGIOUS CHILDREARING
This Article now examines whether substantive due process rights to parental
care, custody, and control of children and dependents requires recognition of
religious healing exemptions. Substantive due process jurisprudence demonstrates
the “play within the joint”184 between “the private realm of family life” and the
exercise of police powers.185 This jurisprudence also demonstrates that infliction of
physical and psychological harm has traditionally provided a baseline for the
termination or interruption of parental rights.
Sole reliance on substantive due process to support religious healing
exemptions is misguided. While Meyer v. Nebraska186 and Pierce v. Society of the Sisters
of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary187 establish the parental rights to the care, custody,
and control of minor children and dependents, Prince v. Massachusetts188 limits
parental autonomy to direct a physically or psychologically harmful religious
training. Wisconsin v. Yoder189 affirms substantive due process as the source of the
right to childrearing, but also preserves the state’s ability to intervene when a
parent’s religious practice potentially harms children. Neither Meyer, Pierce, Prince,
nor Yoder involved medical decisions on behalf of a minor child or dependent. Only
Prince involved religious exercises that could cause harm.
Meyer represents one of the earliest adoptions of constitutionalized parental
autonomy under substantive due process. Robert Meyer objected when Nebraska
limited foreign language instruction for public and private school students in
kindergarten through seventh grade.190 Nebraska did not prohibit teaching ancient
182. See Dwyer, supra note 2, at 163; Dwyer, supra note 75, at 1446 (“To be sure, ‘the child is
not the mere creature of the State,’ but the child is also not the mere creature of the parent, nor of the
religious community to which the parent belongs. Rather, the child is his or her own person. A child
may lack a fully formed independent character, but is nonetheless an individual who deserves the same
respect accorded adults.” (citation omitted)).
183. Dwyer, supra note 2, at 164.
184. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718–19 (2004).
185. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
186. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
187. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
188. Prince, 321 U.S. at 158.
189. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
190. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 396–97.
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or dead languages, such as Latin, Greek, and Hebrew.191 Nebraska did prohibit
teaching German, French, Spanish, Italian, and any other “alien speech.”192 Meyer
violated the law when he taught German to a ten-year-old student.193 Meyer faced
a thirty-day jail sentence and a $25 to $100 fine.194
The Meyer Court did not question Nebraska’s constitutional police power to
ensure the health and safety of children.195 This included the ability to “compel
attendance” at school,196 and in the right circumstances, the ability to require
English only instruction in schools.197 Meyer instead turned on whether Nebraska
properly exercised its power. Nebraska articulated a legitimate purpose that included
fostering American ideals, but it was also clear that Nebraska sought to establish
English as “the mother tongue” for all children.198 Pointing to the atrocities of
World War I, Meyer acknowledged the allure of establishing a “homogeneous people
with American ideals.”199 However, Nebraska’s attempt to do so violated both the
“letter and spirit” of the U.S. Constitution.200 Knowledge of foreign languages did
not threaten the health, morals, or understanding of citizenship.201 Nor could
Nebraska demonstrate an emergency that rendered knowledge of a foreign language
a danger to national security.202
While Nebraska had a “desirable end,” it used a “prohibited means” to achieve
that end.203 Meyer included religious worship and childrearing within the zone of
constitutionalized protection for family autonomy.204 Meyer established parental
control of minor children and dependents derivative of a parent’s “natural”
duties.205 Nebraska only banned modern languages, and left “complete freedom” to
teach ancient or dead languages.206 Meyer pointed to the lack of choice among
foreign languages as an intrusion on the right to dictate a child’s education.207 Meyer
declared that the U.S. Constitution protects “those who speak other languages as
well as to those born with English on the tongue.”208 Meyer observed how

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

See id. at 400–01.
Id. at 401.
See id. at 396–97, 401.
See id. at 396–97.
See id. at 402.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 402.
Id.
See id. at 401–03.
See id. at 403.
Id. at 401.
Id. at 399.
Id. at 400.
Id. at 403.
See id.
Id. at 401.
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“proficiency in a foreign language seldom comes to one not instructed at an early
age.”209
Incidentally, Meyer reflects a short-lived struggle between 1923 and 1925 to
identify the constitutional source of parental autonomy. In this context, Meyer
provides one side of the then emerging theories of substantive due process and
equal protection. Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary
provides the other. Pierce questioned whether Oregon could compel public school
attendance for children who were between the ages of eight and sixteen.210 Oregon’s
“manifest purpose” was to increase public school attendance.211 The Court
immediately recognized that enforcement of Oregon’s law diminished the
profitability and value of private schools, especially those of the military academy
and orphanage that brought the challenge.212
Pierce firmly established substantive due process as the protectant of parental
autonomy. Pierce recognized that children are not “mere creature[s] of the state.”
While states have general police powers to establish or impose educational
standards,213 states lack the power to impose a standardized education.214 Parents,
not states, have the right and duty to prepare children for adulthood.215 Oregon
intruded on the “liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control.”216
Pierce, like Meyer, limited the state’s ability to intrude on a parent’s right to make
educational choices. Much like Nebraska in Meyer failed to demonstrate that the
mere knowledge of German, or any other foreign language harmed children,
Oregon in Pierce failed to show that a private school education was inherently
harmful to children. In both cases, neither foreign language ability nor a private
school education justified Nebraska and Oregon’s means, respectively.
Despite constitutionalized parental rights, Prince v. Massachusetts demonstrates
that states have some power to intrude on a parent’s ability to direct a minor child or
dependent’s religious education. At first blush, Prince presents “another episode in
the conflict between Jehovah’s Witnesses and state authority.”217 Sarah Prince and
her nine-year-old niece often distributed religious periodicals on the streets of
Brockton in exchange for a suggested five-cent donation.218 The solicitations
implicated a Massachusetts labor law that applied to boys under twelve and girls
under eighteen.219 Both Prince and her niece, who was in Prince’s legal custody,
209.
210.
(1925).
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 403.
See Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 530
Id. at 531.
See id. at 531–34.
See id. at 534.
See id. at 535.
See id.
Id. at 534–35.
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 159 (1944).
See id. at 161.
See id. at 160–61.
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were ordained ministers in their church and described religious duty as their
motivation.220
Prince squarely lies at the intersection of a parent’s religious freedom under the
First Amendment and “parental right[s] as secured by the due process clause.”221
Prince recognized three competing interests.222 First, the parent’s right to teach the
tenets and the practices of a chosen faith.223 Second, the child’s right to observe and
“preach the gospel.”224 Third, the state’s interest in protecting the child’s welfare.225
On the latter, Prince acknowledged the state’s duty to safeguard children from abuses
and to give children the opportunity to grow into free, independent, and well
developed citizens.226
Prince did not examine religious childrearing in a vacuum, but delicately
balanced those rights with state authority.227 Prince established “that the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents.”228 Prince mandated respect
for this “private realm of family life.”229 On the other hand, Prince gives reason to
question whether an absolute right exists to make religiously motivated medical
decisions for minor children and dependents.230 Prince declined to place religious
childrearing beyond the reach of state interference when such education puts a
child’s health and safety at risk.231 Prince hinges on whether Massachusetts
sufficiently justified its child labor laws.232 Prince identifies “the crippling effects of
child employment” as an appropriate evil to justify the exercise of police power233
against claims of parental autonomy.234
Prince established “psychological or physical injury” as the baseline to
distinguish between religious training that was appropriate for children and that
which was inappropriate for children.235 Prince prothesized that even “[t]he zealous
though lawful exercise” of religious liberty “may and at times does create
situations . . . wholly inappropriate for children, especially of tender years, to
face.”236 Prince pointed out how religious training that is “permissible for adults . . .
may not be so for children.”237 Prince explained:
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

See id. at 161–64.
Id. at 164.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 165.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 166.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 166–67.
See id. at 167.
Id. at 168.
See id. at 169.
Id. at 169–70.
Id.
Id. at 169.
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The state’s authority over children’s activities is broader than over like
actions of adults. This is peculiarly true of public activities and matters of
employment. A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens,
with all that implies.238
Monopoli theorizes that Prince draws a clear line between a parent’s right to
inculcate children with the parent’s religious beliefs and state statutes that protect
the physical safety of children.239 “While the state must yield in the former case, the
parent’s free exercise must yield in the latter.”240 Merrick describes this tension as
the intersection of “divine love” and “the best interest of the child.”241
Wisconsin v. Yoder242 affirms the Prince psychological or physical harm baseline
as the trigger for state authority to protect children.243 Yoder involved Wisconsin’s
requirement that all children attend school until age sixteen.244 Members of the
Amish religion objected and refused to send their children to any school after eighth
grade.245 Wisconsin charged, convicted, and fined several Amish parents who were
in violation of the law.246 At trial, uncontradicted expert testimony established that
in Amish communities, a “life aloof from the world was not merely preferred, but
essential to the Amish faith.”247 The Wisconsin Circuit Court affirmed the
convictions.248 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, found an infringement of
the parent’s free exercise rights.249
Yoder offers a nuanced reading of the balance between parental rights to
religious childrearing and state power to burden that right. Citing Pierce, Yoder
recognizes that states have “a high responsibility” to “educate its citizens.”250 Yoder
also recognizes that states can “impose reasonable regulations for the control and
duration of education.”251 However, Yoder explained that:
[I]n order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond eighth grade
against a claim that such attendance interferes with the practice of a
legitimate religious belief, it must appear either that the State does not deny
the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state

238. Id. at 168; see also id. at 170 (“Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it
does not follow that they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before
they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for themselves.”).
239. See Monopoli, supra note 25, at 327.
240. Id.
241. Merrick, supra note 53, at 269.
242. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
243. See id. at 233–34.
244. Id. at 207.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 208.
247. Id. at 209; see also id. at 209–13.
248. Id. at 213.
249. See id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
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interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection
under the Free Exercise Clause.252
Yoder further explained that state authority to regulate should sometimes “yield
to the right of parents to provide education in a privately-operated system.”253
Yoder acknowledged how Prince cautioned against an absolute right to religious
training and indoctrination of children that was free from state intervention.254
Thus, Yoder focused on Wisconsin’s interest to promote good citizenship by
providing education.255 Wisconsin argued its interest in compulsory education was
“so compelling that even the established religious practices of the Amish must give
way.”256 The Court rejected this argument and found that Wisconsin failed to
demonstrate a sufficient relationship between its law (compelling public or private
school education until age sixteen) and its interest (promoting good citizenship).257
“[A]n additional one or two years of formal high school for Amish children in place
of their long-established program of informal vocational education would do little
to serve [Wisconsin’s] interests.”258
Yoder supports recognition of parental autonomy to religious indoctrination of
minor children and dependents, but that recognition is qualified. At that time,
compulsory education beyond eighth grade was a “relatively recent development”
in U.S. history.259 Moreover, the uncontradicted expert testimony at trial greatly
influenced the Court’s reasoning.260 Wisconsin also failed to show whether the lack
of public or private school education beyond age sixteen caused members of the
Amish community to be anti-education, unproductive, or prone to criminal
behavior.261
Yoder recognized that in certain situations, a parent’s right to childrearing—
religious or otherwise—could be subject to state regulation. Yoder also retained the
Prince physical/psychological harm baseline.262 Yoder and Prince are distinguishable
by the legislation involved. Religious healing exemptions are more analogous to
Prince, which involved conduct that could legitimately harm a child.263 The types of
harms that religious healing present to children are well documented.264
Any reading of Yoder to support a parental right to unfettered religious
childrearing fails to appreciate the delicate “balance between the parents’ religious

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id. at 214; see also id. at 215–19.
Id. at 213.
See id.
See id. at 221.
Id.
See id. at 221–29.
Id. at 222.
Id. at 226.
See id. at 222.
See id. at 222–25.
See id. at 230.
See id. at 229–30.
Id. at 230.
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beliefs and the physical and psychological needs of the child.”265 To the extent that
proponents can rely on Yoder, such reliance cannot occur in vacuity. In Idaho, the
child mortality rate among at least one religious healing community averages tentimes the statewide average.266 In one county alone, unsuccessful religious healing
allegedly resulted in three child deaths in a four-month period.267 Asser and Swan,
Fretwell Wilson, Massie, and Merrick have reported other child deaths from curable
diseases, illnesses, and injuries that may have resulted after unsuccessful religious
healing.268
Yoder, Prince, Pierce, and Meyer reveal one-half of the jurisprudential gap that
allows for the existence of religious healing exemptions, as none of these cases
discuss parental autonomy to make medical decisions on behalf of a minor child or
dependent. Because of this gap, exemptions can explicitly fail to address
nonconsenting parents, who often “share” substantive due process rights to a child.
Instead, exemptions assume a homogenous household of two parents, both of
whom are in agreement with the decision to forgo medical care. Many parents have
children outside of wedlock.269 Exemptions are silent on whether unmarried or
married parents have to agree to forgo medical attention. In states with an
exemption, religious healing parents can potentially ignore or disregard the rights of
a nonconsenting parents with primary custody and control of the child.
The number of nonconsenting parents trapped in the substantive due process
jurisprudential gap is unknown. The failure of exemptions to account for rights of
nonconsenting parents is arguably fatal when one considers Stanley v. Illinois,270
which extended substantive due process rights to unmarried parents.271 Joan and
Peter Stanley lived together intermittently for eighteen years, during which time they
had three children.272 When Joan died, Illinois instituted dependency
proceedings.273 Without declaring Stanley unfit, Illinois declared the children wards
of the state.274 Illinois took custody of the children and placed them with courtappointed guardians.275 Stanley questioned whether Illinois must show cause before

265. Sana Loue, Parentally Mandated Religious Healing for Children: A Therapeutic Justice
Approach, 27 J.L. & RELIGION 397, 407 (2012).
266. Lehr, supra note 11; see also CHILD DEATHS IN IDAHO 2012, supra note 11, at 4, 59–60;
CHILD DEATHS IN IDAHO 2013, supra note 11, at 6, 77–78.
267. Russell, supra note 153; see also Martin, supra note 153.
268. See Asser & Swan, supra note 159, at 626–27; Massie, supra note 53, at 746; Merrick, supra
note 53, at 274; Wilson, supra note 26, at 1383.
269. See Unmarried Childbearing, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/unmarried-childbearing.htm [https://perma.cc/W6PA-R8Z6]
(last updated Mar. 31, 2017).
270. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
271. See id. at 658; see also Josh Gupta-Kagan, Stanley v. Illinois’s Untold Story, 24 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 773, 787 (2016).
272. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645.
273. Id.
274. See id. at 646–47.
275. See id.
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denying custody to unwed fathers when the mothers of their children die.276
Although the Court did not find an equal protection violation based on gender,
Illinois’ presumption of unfitness applied only to unwed fathers.277 That
presumption proved fatal to the extent that it failed to take into account the
substantive due process rights of unwed fathers.278 Stanley serves as a viable option
for a nonconsenting parent to challenge religious healing exemptions. Parental
rights—even constitutionally protected rights—are rarely unfettered and the rights
of one parent rarely trump the rights of another. In this respect, Stanley’s extension
of substantive due process protections to both married and unmarried parents should
cause religious healing states to rethink their failure to address the rights of
nonconsenting parents. Stanley found that familial bonds create no distinction
between rights of wed or unwed parents.279 Both categories constitute a warm,
enduring, and important family unit.280 Professor Josh Gupta-Kagan offers a
detailed recount of how four members of the 5–2 Stanley Court switched their vote
from the 1971 conference to the 1972 decision, thereby perhaps changing the
outcome of the case.281 The Justices’ movement reveals a narrative about perils of
creating classifications of parental rights.282 Four years prior to Stanley, the Court
struck down a statute that denied children wrongful death damages based on the
marital status of their parents.283 Incidentally, no equal protection claim based on a
gender classification had ever been successful before Reed v. Reed,284 which was
argued the same day as Stanley.285
Putting aside the failure of religious healing states to account for the rights of
nonconsenting parents, proponents of religious healing exemptions also invoke the
First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. Next, this Article discusses religious
exemption jurisprudence, which demonstrates the limits of free exercise rights as
they pertain to neutral and generally applicable criminal laws. This jurisprudence
also demonstrates the other half of the jurisprudential gap that allows for the
existence of religious healing exemptions.
III. RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS AND THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
Professor James DeLise describes the conflict between the free exercise of
religious belief and the duty to comply with neutral laws of general applicability as
“a conflict that has deep roots in American history, dating back to colonial and pre-

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.

See id. at 657–58.
See id. 653–56.
See id. at 653–58.
See id. at 651–52.
See id.
See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 271, at 792–810.
See id. at 787–90.
See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 271, at 787–88.
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constitutional periods.”286 With DeLise’s words in mind, this Article now examines
whether the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause requires recognition of
religious healing exemptions.287 This Part discusses Reynolds v. United States,288
Sherbert v. Verner,289 United States v. Seeger,290 and Employment Division, Department
of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,291 which best exemplify the “ever-changing”292
nature of this jurisprudence. These cases demonstrate that exemptions are not
required in all cases, but only those where a law places a sufficient-enough burden
on religious practice. None of these cases concern exemptions for religious healing
parents.
Reynolds v. United States ranks as one of the oldest cases on the issue of
religious exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause. Reynolds involved the 1878
criminal prosecution of George Reynolds293 for violating a Utah statute that
provided, in part:
Every person having a husband or wife living, who marries another,
whether married or single, in a Territory, or other place over which the
United States has exclusive jurisdiction, is guilty of bigamy, and shall be
punished by a fine of not more than $500, and by imprisonment for a term
of not more than five years.294
Reynolds pleaded not guilty to bigamy.295 At trial, the prosecution offered
evidence that Reynolds married Amelia Jane Schofield while still married to Mary
Ann Tuddenham.296 Reynolds’s primary defense was that male members of his
church were required to have more than one wife.297 Upon offering proof of his
religious duty,298 Reynolds argued the court should direct the jury to enter a verdict
of not guilty.299

286. DeLise, supra note 75, at 120.
287. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
288. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
289. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
290. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
291. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
292. Mark Strasser, Free Exercise and Substantial Burdens Under Federal Law, 94 NEB. L. REV. 633,
634 (2016).
293. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 146.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 148.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 161. Reynolds was “a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints”
and “a believer” that “it was the duty of male members of said church, circumstances permitting, to
practice polygamy.” Id. Reynolds described the duty to practice polygamy as being of “divine origin”
revealed from “the Almighty God” to Joseph Smith, the founder of the Mormon Church. Id. According
to Mormon doctrine, the failure to practice polygamy “would be punished” by “damnation in the life
to come.” Id.
298. See id. Reynolds allegedly received permission to enter into a polygamous marriage from
Daniel Wells, who had authority to perform marriages and in fact performed the marriage between
Reynolds and Schofield. Id.
299. See id. at 161–62.
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The Court rejected religious belief as a per se justification for criminality,300
but also recognized that the First Amendment forbids Congress from prohibiting
the free exercise of religion.301 Reynolds acknowledged the historical underpinnings
of the Free Exercise Clause, including early colonial attempts to prevent specific
religious practices and later colonial attempts to constitutionalize freedom of
religious belief and practice.302 DeLise hypothesizes that, although the Framers of
the U.S. Constitution “did not expressly address” First Amendment exemptions in
their debates at the 1787 Constitutional Convention, there is no substantial proof
that they considered exemptions antithetical to constitutional principles.303
Professor Mark Strasser points out that when Reynolds was decided, all states
prohibited polygamy.304 At that time, the western legal tradition, as well as the
tradition of most U.S. states, considered polygamy an odious practice.305 Ultimately,
the Court held that it was within the legitimate scope of government power to
determine whether to allow polygamy because marriage was a civil contract
regulated by law.306
Reynolds is perhaps most notable for defining the line between the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses: “[l]aws are made for the government of
actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they
may with practices.”307 In rejecting an absolute right to religious practice, Reynolds
recognized that citizens should not become a law unto themselves.308 The Court
went further, reasoning that a religious exemption to monogamous marriage would
“make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land.”309
Reynolds touched upon the subject of religious healing exemptions, which at
the time were nonexistent in most states. The Court also discussed Regina v.
Wagstaffe,310 an 1868 English criminal case involving the prosecution of parents who
failed to provide medical care for a sick child. Reynolds reflected upon Wagstaffe in
terms of positive and negative acts.311 For example, if the child had starved to death
because his or her parents refused to provide food, then the Wagstaffe parents would
have acted positively and been deemed guilty of manslaughter.312 “[W]hen an
offense consists of a positive act which is knowingly done, it would be dangerous
to hold that the offender might escape punishment because he religiously believed

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

See id. at 162–68.
Id. at 162.
See id. at 162–64.
DeLise, supra note 75, at 121.
See Strasser, supra note 292, at 635.
See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164–65.
Id. at 165–66.
Id. at 166.
Id. at 167.
Id.
Regina v. Wagstaff, 10 Cox’s Crim. Cases 531 (1868) (U.K.).
See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167.
See id.
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the law which he had broken ought never to have been made.”313 Arguably, Reynolds
remains ambiguous on whether the failure to provide care to a sick child constitutes
a negative or positive act. Two of many interpretations of the opinion are plausible.
First, the Reynolds Court believed the Wagstaffe jury viewed the parents’ failure to
provide care as a negative. Second, the Reynolds Court itself viewed the Wagstaffe
parents’ failure as a negative.
Strasser theorizes that Reynolds demonstrates an original distaste for religious
exemptions.314 Nevertheless, Reynolds offers very little guidance on whether the Free
Exercise Clause requires an exemption for religious healing parents; neither do
subsequent decisions. In Braunfeld v. Brown,315 the Court rejected a challenge to
Pennsylvania’s Sunday closing laws.316 The plaintiffs, who were Orthodox Jews,
maintained Sunday closing laws economically disadvantaged Saturday Sabbatarians
who were already required to close their stores from sundown Friday to sundown
Saturday.317 The Court distinguished between the absolute right to religious belief
and the qualified right to religious practice.318 Incidental burdens on religious
practice are tolerable as long as the law does not target or discriminate against
religion.319 Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc.320 also involved a Jewish
individual’s challenge to a Sunday closing law.321 The Court quickly disposed of the
free exercise claims in two paragraphs on the theory that Braunfeld controlled.322
By 1963, Sherbert v. Verner323 became one of few cases to recognize a religious
exemption. Adell Sherbert was a Seventh-day Adventist who was discharged
because she would not work on Saturday.324 The South Carolina Employment
Compensation Act provided that claimants must be able and available to accept
“suitable work when offered.”325 The South Carolina Employment Security
Commission found that Sherbert lacked good cause when she refused to accept
“suitable work when offered.”326 Sherbert argued South Carolina’s unemployment
compensation law violated the Free Exercise Clause.327 The South Carolina

313. Id.
314. See Strasser, supra note 292, at 636.
315. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
316. Id. at 600.
317. Id. at 601.
318. See id. at 603 (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166).
319. See id. at 605–08. The Braunfeld Court explained that, because “we are a cosmopolitan
nation made up of people of almost every conceivable religious preference, . . . we cannot afford the
luxury of deeming presumptively invalid . . . every regulation of conduct” that burdens religious
practice. Id. at 606.
320. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt. of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
321. Id. at 618–19; see also Strasser, supra note 292, at 641 (citing Gallagher, 366 U.S. at 630–31).
322. See Gallagher, 366 U.S. at 630–31.
323. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
324. Id. at 398–99.
325. Id. at 400–01.
326. Id. at 401.
327. Id.
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Supreme Court disagreed328 and held the law did not prevent Sherbert from
exercising her “right and freedom to observe religious beliefs in accordance with
the dictates of her conscious.”329
Sherbert ended the fight to gain recognition of a Saturday Sabbath in
accordance with religious belief, which began two years earlier in Braunfeld330 and
Gallagher.331 Sherbert affirmed the qualified nature of the Free Establishment Clause.
Religious practice is not “totally free” from regulation and the government can
restrict “certain overt acts promoted by religious beliefs or principles.”332 The
question of whether government regulation impermissibly burdened Sherbert’s
religious belief hinged on two questions: first, whether the failure to grant an
exemption for unemployment benefits imposed a burden on Sherbert’s free
exercise of religion; second, whether such burden can be justified by a “compelling
state interest in the regulation of a subject within [South Carolina’s] constitutional
power to regulate.”333
DeLise describes Sherbert as the first free exercise case to grant “a
constitutional right of exemption from neutral laws of general applicability.”334 The
Sherbert Court found a clear imposition on religious practice.335 Sherbert also makes
it clear that freedom of religious practice involves a “highly sensitive constitutional
area.”336 “[N]o showing of merely a rational relationship to some colorable state
interest would suffice[,]”337 regardless of whether unemployment compensation
benefits constituted a right or a privilege.338 Because administrative burdens did not
underlie South Carolina’s refusal to grant an exemption,339 Sherbert could safely turn
away from Braunfeld and Gallagher340 by distinguishing the magnitude of the
administrative burdens in the latter cases as insurmountable.341
Sherbert recognizes the government’s obligation to remain neutral in the face
of religious differences.342 Perhaps in awareness of previous failures to provide an
exemption in accordance to Jewish beliefs in Braunfeld and Gallagher, the Sherbert
Court not-so-subtly denies fostering the “establishment of a Seventh-day Adventist
religion in South Carolina.”343 Sherbert declared the neutrality requirement
prohibited states from excluding “Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists,
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Id.
Id.
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605–08 (1961).
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt. of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617, 618–19 (1961).
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
Id.
DeLise, supra note 75, at 122.
See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404–06.
Id. at 406.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 409.
See id. at 408–09.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 409.
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Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith,
because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare
legislation.”344 Sherbert’s religious practice did not infringe on any other person’s
constitutional rights.345 Nor did Sherbert’s beliefs make her an unproductive
member of society.346 Thus, South Carolina could not apply its eligibility provisions
in a way that forced “a worker to abandon religious convictions respecting the day
of rest.”347
A trio of conscientious objector cases that began two years after Sherbert
clarifies the meaning of “religion” for purposes of the First Amendment. 348 After
his student classifications expired, Daniel Seeger refused to submit to an induction
in the armed forces on the ground that he was “conscientiously opposed to
participation in war in any form by reason of his ‘religious’ belief.”349 Seeger argued
for an exemption as a religious objector under section 6(j) of the Universal Military
Training and Services Act.350 Seeger did not specify which sect of religion justified
his belief.351 Seeger did confess to a “‘skepticism or disbelief in the existence of
God,’” but argued that his uncertainty did “not necessarily mean lack of faith in
anything.”352 Seeger preferred to leave to question his belief in a “Supreme
Being.”353 However, Seeger did profess a “belief in and devotion to goodness and
virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed,” and cited
Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza as inspiration.354 Military officials and the district court
deemed Seeger ineligible for an exemption because his belief was not “in relation to
a Supreme Being.”355 The Southern District of New York convicted Seeger, but the
Second Circuit found a due process violation and reversed.356
The Seeger Court also reviewed two other denials of religious exemptions from
military service. The Second Circuit previously overturned Arno Jakobson’s
conviction.357 Military officials originally classified Jakobson as a student358 and
denied an exemption when his student classification expired.359 Unlike Seeger,

344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

Id. at 410.
Id. at 409.
See id. at 410.
Id.
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
Id. at 166.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 166–67.
Id. at 167.
See id.
See id.
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Jakobson based his eligibility on religion.360 Jakobson confessed “his ‘most
important religious law’ was that ‘no man ought ever to willfully sacrifice another
man’s life as a means to any other end.’”361 Military officials found Jakobson’s belief
to be in accord with a personal moral code, not religion.362 Military officials also
refused to classify Forest Britt Peter’s belief as religious.363 Peter believed in “some
power of manifest nature which helps man in the ordering of his life in harmony
with its demands.”364 Peter cited democratic American culture, western religion, and
philosophical traditions as inspiration.365 Peter hedged on whether he believed in a
“Supreme Being” and instead argued that participation in war violated his moral
code against taking human life.366 Peter argued this belief was superior to his
obligation to the government.367
Seeger extends First Amendment protections to beliefs that do not seem
entirely “religious.” Seeger also demonstrates the Court’s struggle to define “religion”
for purposes of the First Amendment. After examining the background and
previous interpretations of section 6(j), the Court found itself at a crossroad on
what statutory definition of “religious belief” Congress intended to adopt.368 Seeger
ultimately adopted a statutory construction that embraced an “ever-broadening
understanding of modern religious thought.”369 The government must give “great
weight” to an objector’s claim that a particular belief is an essential part of faith.370
Moreover, the government cannot question the validity of any belief.371
Describing religious belief as “intensely personal,”372 Seeger established a twopart test for whether a particular belief is “religious enough” for purposes of the
First Amendment.373 First, the belief must be sincere and meaningful.374 Second,
the belief must occupy “a place parallel to that filled by the God.”375 This was all
360. See id. at 167–68. Jakobson “explained that his religious and social thinking had developed
after much meditation and thought. He had concluded that man must be ‘partly spiritual’ and, therefore,
‘partly akin to the Supreme Reality’ . . . .” Id.
361. Id. at 168.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 169.
364. Id. This belief was derived from Reverend John Haynes Holmes’s definition of religion.
See id.
365. See id.
366. Id.
367. See id.
368. Id. at 169–79.
369. Id. at 180.
370. Id. at 184.
371. Id. See also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (“Men may believe what they
cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious
experiences which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others.”). Local boards and
courts in this sense are not free to reject beliefs because they consider them “incomprehensible.” See id.
372. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184.
373. Id. at 176. A 1940 version of the Universal Military Training and Services Act was the
source of Seeger’s two-part test to define religion. See id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
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the Court found necessary to qualify for an exemption from military service.376
According to Seeger, this construction avoids imputing to “Congress an intent to
classify different religious beliefs, exempting some and excluding others.”377
Additionally, it did not appear Congress intended a more restrictive meaning.378
Ultimately, Seeger, Jakobson, and Peter were entitled to an exemption.379
Scholars dispute whether Seeger reflects a constitutional interpretation of the
term “religion” for purposes of the First Amendment.380 The second of the trio of
religious objector cases, Welsh v. United States,381 interpreted Seeger broadly. Elliot
Welsh objected to military service for nonreligious reasons.382 The Court
overturned the lower court’s denial of a nonreligious exemption,383 reasoning that
the exemption applies to “all those whose consciences, spurred by deeply held
moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace if they allowed
themselves to become a part of an instrument of war.”384 As a result, Welsh was
entitled to the same exemption as provided in Seeger.385
The last of the trio of religious objector cases, Gillette v. United States,386 does
not answer whether Seeger reflects a constitutional interpretation of the term
“religion” for purposes of the First Amendment. Having deemed the Vietnam War
to be unjust, Guy Gillette refused to participate.387 The Court rejected Gillette’s
entitlement to an exemption on the ground that an individual can object to war in
general, but not participation in a particular war.388 If nothing else, Gillette
demonstrates a willingness to construe narrowly the available exemptions for
contentious objectors: one can object to participation in all war; but if one is willing
to participate, one must do so in every war. What remains unclear is whether
Gillette’s reasoning rests on the distinction between the absolute right to religious
belief and the qualified right to religious practice or whether the Gillette Court
considered the alleged burden on religious practice as merely incidental.
Many of the post-conscientious objector cases provide little to distinguish
legitimate and illegitimate free exercise claims under Sherbert. Thomas v. Review Board
376. See id.
377. Id.
378. See id. at 177.
379. See id. at 185–88.
380. Compare Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Questions
of Religious Practice and Belief, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85, 99 (1997) (noting that Seeger involves only a
statutory interpretation of the term religion), with Sherryl E. Michaelson, Religion and Morality
Legislation: A Reexamination of Establishment Clause Analysis, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301, 353 (1984)
(noting that scholars and commentators refer to Seeger as more than a statutory interpretation, but also
a constitutional interpretation of the term religion).
381. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
382. See id. at 335–37.
383. Id. at 344.
384. See id. at 344.
385. Id. at 335–43.
386. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
387. Id. at 439–41.
388. See id. at 443, 447; see also Strasser, supra note 292, at 641.
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of Indiana Employment Security Division389 granted an exemption to Eddie Thomas,
who quit his job producing weapons for conscientious reasons.390 In United States
v. Lee,391 the Court denied an exemption for Amish participation in the social
security system.392 Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor393 denied an
exemption under the Fair Labor Standards Act for an employer who sought to pay
employees in food, shelter, clothing, transportation, and medical care instead of
wages.394 In Bowen v. Roy,395 the Court rejected a claim that the assignment of a
social security number would hinder spirituality.396 The Court reasoned the First
Amendment did not require the government to further “spiritual development.”397
Finally, both Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock398 and Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board
of Equalization of California399 denied claims for an exemption against sales and use
taxes.400
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith401
dramatically changed Sherbert’s free exercise landscape by lessening the standard for
criminal laws that are neutral and of general applicability. Alfred Smith and Galen
Black were members of the Native American Church.402 Both applied for
unemployment compensation benefits after they “were fired from their jobs with a
private rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote for sacramental
purposes” at a church ceremony.403 Oregon prohibited the ingestion of peyote
unless prescribed by a medical practitioner.404 Oregon deemed Smith and Black
ineligible for unemployment benefits due to their work-related misconduct.405
Smith preserves Reynolds’ aversion to exemptions for religious practice even
though Smith involved a law that makes no mention of religion or religious belief.406
The Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court found the
misconduct provision inadequately justified and remanded for a determination of
the legality of religious use of peyote in Oregon.407 After finding that Oregon
389. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
390. See id. at 711, 717–19.
391. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
392. See id. at 254–61.
393. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985).
394. See id. at 293, 302–05.
395. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
396. See id. at 699.
397. Id.
398. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
399. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
400. See id. at 384, 391; Tex. Monthly, 489 U.S. at 17–20.
401. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute,
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012)).
402. Id. at 874.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. See id.
406. See id.
407. Id. at 875–76.
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“makes no exception for the sacramental use” of peyote, the Oregon Supreme
Court again struck down the statute as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.408
Smith makes clear that governments cannot prefer a particular religious belief
or practice.409 Smith did not completely abandon, but rather limits Sherbert to the
employment compensation context.410 “[T]he government’s ability to enforce
generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct . . . ‘cannot depend on
measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual
development.’”411 Smith does not designate any alternative level of scrutiny, but the
Court’s abandonment of heightened scrutiny seems to imply the application of a
rational basis-like review for criminal laws that are neutral and of general
applicability.
Reynolds, Sherbert, Seeger, and Smith demonstrate a free exercise jurisprudential
gap that allows for the existence of religious healing exemptions. The free exercise
jurisprudential gap also gives reason to doubt the necessity for an exemption when a
parent’s religious practice causes physical or psychological harm to minor children
or dependents.412 Smith rejected the view that the First Amendment prohibits
forcing individuals “to observe a generally applicable law that requires (or forbids)
the performance of an act that his religious belief forbids (or requires).”413 Smith
points to more than a century of free exercise jurisprudence to cast doubt on
whether “an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the state is free to regulate.”414 Put
another way, “[c]onscientious scruples have not . . . relieved the individual from
obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious
beliefs.”415
Religious healing exemptions involve conduct that would otherwise be
classified as criminal and thus more analogous to Smith, which demoted Sherbert’s
compelling interest standard for neutral and generally applicable criminal laws. Smith
also reiterated the defining line between religious belief and practice recognized in
Reynolds.416 DeLise points to a major distinction between Sherbert and Smith—
particularly that between exemptions for legal versus illegal behavior.417 DeLise also
discusses how religious healing exemptions implicate another important aspect of
free exercise jurisprudence—the inability of the government to favor or disfavor
religious practices.
408. Id. at 876 (quoting Smith v. Emp’t Div., 763 P.2d 146, 148 (1988)).
409. See id. at 877.
410. Id. at 883.
411. Id. at 885 (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451
(1988)).
412. See id. at 882–83.
413. Id. at 878.
414. Id. at 878–79.
415. Id. at 879 (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940), overruled by
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
416. See id. at 877–78.
417. See DeLise, supra note 75, at 125.
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The free exercise jurisprudential gap also allows for arguably inadequate
regulation of religious healing. While many states allow judicial interference in
religious healing cases involving a child,418 states also require courts to take into
account the preference for religious healing.419 In rural states like Idaho, religious
healing communities are often located in remote or isolated areas that contain few
nonreligious healers.420 State authorities may be unaware of a child’s illness. Even
when state officials are aware, circumstances complicate investigations of a religious
healing death. In Idaho, the decision to prosecute implicates other stakeholders like
Sheriff Donahue in Canyon County, who has described the difficulties he faces
when investigating child deaths in religious healing communities.421 Those
difficulties can prevent a determination of whether the exemption applies. Thus,
either through negligence or by design, exemptions offer less protection for the lives
of children in religious healing homes.
The free exercise jurisprudential gap allows religious healing states to ignore
the child’s “constitutional rights to the protection of their lives and to their own
free exercise values.”422 This gap also blurs the line between a state’s infringement
on parental rights and a state’s constitutional exercise of its parens patriae authority
to protect children. Vulnerable children are trapped in the free exercise
jurisprudential gap in the same way that nonconsenting parents are trapped in the
substantive due process jurisprudential gap.
The free exercise jurisprudential gap that allows for religious healing
exemptions also exposes an inconsistency in some states’ approach to protecting
life altogether. Starvation and malnourishment of children are commonly
prosecuted.423 In one Idaho county alone, religious healing is suspected to have
caused three child deaths in four months.424 County prosecutors have filed no
charges related to those incidents.425

418. See Wilson & Sanders, supra note 26.
419. See id.
420. See id.
421. See id.; see also Duara, supra note 14; Wolf, supra note 14.
422. Massie, supra note 53, at 770.
423. See Marwa Eltagouri, Parents Charged with Murder for Starving 6-Year-Old as Punishment,
Police Say, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/true-crime/wp/
2017/11/07/parents-charged-with-murder-for-starving-6-year-old-as-punishment-police-say/?utm_
term=.3365d8f2458f; Tara Fowler, Pennsylvania Parents Accused of Starving Their Nine-Year-Old Son
to Death Pled Guilty to Murder, PEOPLE (Oct. 26, 2015), http://people.com/crime/parents-accusedof-starving-their-9-year-old-son-to-death-plead-guilty-to-murder/ [https://perma.cc/9TKU-FF3R];
Taylor Rios, Parents and Grandmother Allegedly Starved Nine-Year-Old to Death, All Three Charged
with Murder in Hawaii, INQUISITR ( Jul. 16, 2017), https://www.inquisitr.com/4372303/parentsand-grandmother-allegedly-starved-9-year-old-to-death-all-three-charged-with-murder-in-hawaii/
[https://perma.cc/K5TB-X3YM]; Ashley Shook, 9-Year-Old Starved to Death, WWLP.COM (Feb. 23,
2017, 1:49 PM), http://wwlp.com/2017/02/23/9-year-old-starved-to-death [https://web.archive.org/
web/20170228011906/http://wwlp.com/2017/02/23/9-year-old-starved-to-death].
424. See Russell, supra note 19; see also Duara, supra note 14.
425. See Duara, supra note 14.
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The inconsistency of some states’ approach to protecting life extends to state
regulations that apply before and after birth. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey identified the moment of conception as the start of the state’s
compelling interest to protect children.426 In furtherance of their interest to protect
life before birth, some religious healing states have imposed a multitude of
regulations aimed toward those who seek to terminate a pregnancy—a right that,
unlike religious healing, has been deemed constitutionally fundamental.427 Evasive
and often unnecessary medical procedures serve to provide potential parents with
information about unborn life. Waiting periods of up to seventy-two hours force
potential parents to postpone procedures in order to “reflect” upon the decision to
terminate a pregnancy. Avoidance of fetal pain justified attempts to close the
window for legal procedures. In Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellersteadt, the Court
recently struck down unduly burdensome credentialing requirements and
regulations for facilities that supposedly ensured the health and safety of patients.428
The free exercise jurisprudential gap allows states to decline to impose
regulations to direct the behavior of religious healing parents while at the same time
heavily regulate parents who seek to terminate a pregnancy. Exemptions do not
require religious healing parents to consult a doctor or obtain any information about
their child’s health. Further, no exemption forces a religious healing parent to wait
and reflect upon their decision. No exemption imposes a waiting period that delays
the exercise of the choice to pursue religious healing. Nor do exemptions regulate
religious healing practitioners and their facilities.
An analysis of the disparity between religious healing parents and parents who
terminate a pregnancy may cause discomfort, but such discomfort may be a natural
result of jurisprudential gaps. In many religious healing states, the unborn receives
more protection than some who are born because exemptions provide a broader
scope of parental autonomy than both substantive due process and free exercise
jurisprudence require. Vulnerable children and nonconsenting parents remain
trapped in jurisprudential gaps either through negligence or by design. As a result,
in some states’ religious belief may ultimately trigger the state’s exercise of its own
authority.
CONCLUSION
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health recognizes that adults and
emancipated minors have the right to refuse medical treatment.429 The question
remains whether parents have the right to exercise that choice on behalf of their
minor children and dependents. This Article brings together free exercise
jurisprudence and parental rights jurisprudence and places both in the context of
religious healing exemptions. In doing so, this Article demonstrates how religious
426.
427.
428.
429.

See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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healing lies at intersection of substantive due process and the Free Exercise Clause.
This understanding of the interplay between free exercise and substantive due
process jurisprudence is necessary to any thoughtful consideration of religious
healing exemptions. This Article also examines the jurisprudential gaps between
both bodies of case law and reveals how nonconsenting parents and vulnerable
children remain trapped in those gaps.

